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Free Fall: The Online Market's Consumer
Preference Disconnect
Katherine J. Strandburgt

INTRODUCTION

Do Internet users "pay" for online products and services
with personal data?' The common analogy between online data
collection for behaviorally targeted advertising and payment for
purchases is seriously misleading. There is no functioning
market based on exchanges of personal information for access to
online products and services. In a functioning market, payment
of a given price signals consumer demand for particular goods
and services, transmitting consumer preferences to producers.
Data collection would serve as "payment" in that critical sense
only if its transfer from users to collectors adequately signaled
user preferences for online goods and services. It does not.
Indeed, the behavioral advertising business model leads to a
failed online market and erects barriers to entry for no-datacollection alternatives. The market failure is due in part to the
intertwined nature of personal information and involves
collective action problems that cannot be solved by consent-

t Alfred B. Engelberg Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I am
grateful to participants in the 2012 Chicago Legal Forum symposium and to members of
the NYU Information Law Institute's Privacy Research Group for helpful comments.
Finally, I acknowledge the generous support of the Filomen D. Agostino and Max E.
Greenberg Research Fund.
1 See, for example, Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky, To Track or "Do Not Track"
Advancing Transparency and Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13
Minn J L Sci & Tech 281, 335 (2012) ("Personal data have become a primary feature of
the value exchange in almost any online transaction."); Giacomo Luchetta, Is the Google
Platform A Two-Sided Market? *19 (LUISS and Center of European Policy Studies Apr
2012), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2048683 (visited Sept 15, 2013) (arguing that
Google's "behavior in the market for personal information comes closer to that of a
retailer"); Adam Thierer and Berin Szoka, Targeted Online Advertising: What's the Harm
& Where Are We Heading, 16 The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Progress on Point 1,
5-6 (June 2009), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1348246
(visited Sept 15, 2013).
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based approaches to single transactions. A "Do Not Track"
approach would overcome some of these problems but may well
fail if not backed up by regulation.
This Article begins by exploring three main reasons that
data collection does not perform payment's signaling function in
making markets work. First, the online market is complicated
by the ubiquity of business models bundling advertising with
products and services offered to consumers at zero monetary
price Advertisers, not users, are these businesses' customers.
Their offerings reflect user preferences only indirectly, as
refracted through the preferences of advertisers. This type of
bundling (and preference distortion) is familiar from the
broadcast media but raises new issues in the online behavioral
advertising context. In the broadcast context, consumers are
reasonably able to predict the marginal disutility (or benefit)
they will incur from viewing advertising and thus to signal their
preferences for particular bundles of advertising and broadcast
content through their viewing and listening choices. The
behavioral advertising model introduces an additional type of
consumer cost: the potential disutility from data collection.
Second, Internet users do not know the "prices" they are
paying for products and services supported by behavioral
advertising because they cannot reasonably estimate the
marginal disutility that particular instances of data collection
impose on them. They thus are unable to select among products
and services based on cost and thereby express their
preferences. Online products and services bundled with data
collection are essentially "credence goods"; their qualities cannot
be assessed by consumers either before or after purchase. 2
Finally, the online data collection and aggregation
associated with the behavioral advertising business model
create collective action problems for consumers, impeding them
from expressing their preferences about data collection in
individual transactions. Those collective action problems, in
turn, erect barriers to entry for online businesses employing
paid or contextual advertising business models. As a result of
these factors, the online market is likely to be stuck in a failed

2 See Michael R. Darby and Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount
of Fraud, 16 J L & Econ 67, 68-72, 82 (1973); Uwe Dulleck and Rudolf Kerschbamer, On
Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods, 44 J
Econ Lit 5, 5-6 (2006).
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state in which products and services are tailored to advertiser
preferences for data extraction, rather than to consumer
preferences. There is good reason to suspect that this state is not
optimal for society.
The flaws in the analogy of data collection to payment
matter because of the way the analogy is deployed to support
particular policy conclusions. If the analogy between data
collection and payment made in a voluntary market exchange is
persuasive, then information privacy regulation must be judged
in light of the risk that it will disrupt this functioning market.
Fear of disrupting this supposed market justifies reliance on
self-regulatory approaches and bolsters industry arguments that
government intervention will "kill the Internet."3 If, as argued
here, the behavioral advertising ecosystem turns online products
and services into credence goods, 4 the implications are radically
different. Credence goods, which include medical treatments,
legal services, and so forth, are natural subjects of regulation,
especially when effective screening and signaling methods are
not available. If, in addition, collective action problems thwart
the emergence of alternative business models that might avoid
the credence good problem, the policy arguments in favor of
trusting the market are thoroughly deflated.
Part I of this Article defines what I mean by a "behavioral
advertising business model" and explains how that model differs
from the paid and "contextual advertising" business models.5
a See, for example, Berin Szoka, Privacy Polls v. Real-World Trade-Offs, 5 The
Progress & Freedom Foundation, Progress Snapshot 1, 4-5 (Nov 2009); Adam Thierer,
Unappreciated Benefits of Advertising & Commercial Speech *2-3 (Mercatus Center
George Mason University No 86 Jan 2011), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1741245 (visited Sept 15, 2013); Adam Thierer and Berin Szoka,
Targeted Online Advertising: What's the Harm & Where Are We Heading, 16 The
Progress & Freedom Foundation, Progress on Point 1, 5-8 (June 2009), online at
http: /papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1348246 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons'" Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q J Econ 488, 488 (1970). See also Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information
and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, Part 1, 47 Am Econ 6, 21-22 (2003)
(discussing "signaling" and "screening" as potential market-based remedies to problems
of quality uncertainty). See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in
the Paradigmin Economics, PartII, 48 Am Econ 17 (2004).
5 Throughout this Article, I use "behavioral advertising" as a shorthand to describe
advertising that is targeted to individuals based on data about their characteristics and
behavior. The "behavioral advertising business model" refers to a business model in
which revenue comes from the sale of behavioral advertising. Similarly, "contextual
advertising" is shorthand for advertising that is targeted based on the context that an
individual is visiting online, and a "contextual advertising business model" is one in
which revenue comes from the sale of contextual advertising.

98

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2013

Part II discusses how the behavioral advertising model relates
to advertising-supported business models more generally and to
the concept of a two-sided market. It argues that the behavioral
advertising business model is likely to be far more distortive of
the market's ability to process consumer preferences than either
the broadcast or contextual advertising models. Part III explains
how imperfect consumer information about the potential harms
of data collection, company data practices, and means to
mitigate data collection combine with the properties of
information aggregation and with common behavioral economics
concerns to undercut the market's responsiveness to consumer
preferences. Part IV questions the notion that behavioral
advertising is a necessary foundation for a vibrant Internet and
pulls together the discussion in Parts II and III to explain why
the behavioral advertising model is likely to persist even if
consumers prefer other alternatives. Part V concludes by briefly
discussing the policy implications of the analysis, especially in
light of proposals for a browser-based "Do Not Track" option.
I. ONLINE BUSINESS MODELS
Companies take various approaches to generating revenue
from their online activities.6 In what might be called an ecommerce approach, the Internet is used as a retail storefront
(for example, harney.com or Amazon.com) or sometimes as an
auction house or swap meet (for example, eBay.com). The goal of
such e-commerce approaches is generally, as in traditional
offline markets, to arrange the direct exchange of products or
services for cash or, in some instances, for in-kind payment. This
Article focuses on online advertising-based business models, in
which, rather than facilitating such direct retail transactions,
the Internet is used to deliver some kind of online product or
service bundled with advertising, usually at zero cash price. In
these business models, advertisers, rather than users, are the
primary (or only) direct source of revenue for the company.

See David S. Evans, The Online Advertising Industry: Economics, Evolution, and
Privacy, 23 J Econ Persp 37, 38-40 (2009); David S. Evans, The Web Economy, TwoSided Markets, and Competition Policy *2-3 (University of Chicago and University
College London Apr 2010), online at http: /papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1584363 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
6
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Online advertising approaches can be divided into three
basic types: undirected or "run-of-network,"7 contextual, and
behavioral. Advertisers always seek to reach audiences that will
be receptive to purchasing their products.8 Undirected, or run-ofnetwork, ads aim at wide circulation, with the assumption that
potential buyers will be among a large audience. Online
"contextual advertising" is similar to traditional television or
magazine advertising in that it assumes that purchase
preferences can be correlated with interests in particular types
of content. A contextual ad is placed on a website because the
advertiser anticipates that visitors to that website are likely to
be interested in the advertised product. Contextual ad
placement often is automated, for example by using keyword
matching, as in Google's AdSense program. Whatever the
specific ad placement algorithm, the basic idea is that the
context attracts particular types of consumers who will, on
average, be interested in predictable kinds of ads.
"Behavioral advertising,"9 on the other hand, is selected and
displayed based on information about the individual user, rather
than (or in addition to) information about the context. For
obvious reasons, a behavioral advertising approach requires that
the entity serving up the ad have access to a trove of information
about particular Internet users. It also requires a mechanism for
serving different ads to different users.
While I will discuss these models separately, many online
businesses use mixtures of these basic approaches, and the line
between them is somewhat fuzzy. Consider, for example, searchbased advertising, which is the most lucrative segment of the
online advertising market.10 It can be contextual, in the sense

Run-of-network advertising is placed on any website served by an online
advertising network, without regard to the content of the website or the ad. See, for
example, Bruce C. Brown, How to Use the Internet to Advertise, Promote and Market
Your Business Or Web Site: With Little Or No Money 24 (2006); Run-of-Network,
Marketing Terms, online at http://www.marketingterms.com/dictionary/run of network/
(visited Sept 15, 2013) (providing industry definitions).
8 See Joseph Turow, The Daily You: How the New Advertising Industry is Defining
Your Identity and Your Worth 4, 88-89 (Yale 2012) ("The Daily You").
9 As discussed in note 5, this term is used as a shorthand for "behaviorally targeted
advertising."
'o See Interactive Advertising Bureau, LAB Internet Advertising Revenue Report,
2011 Full Year Results *12 (Interactive Advertising Bureau Apr 2012), online at
http://www.iab.net/medialfile/IABInternetAdvertising.RevenueReportFY_2011.pdf
(visited Sept 15, 2013).
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that it is based only on the search queries entered by the user,
or behaviorally targeted, in that it is based on data about the
user accumulated at other times (earlier searches) or from other
contexts (such as email or more general web-surfing). The
critical distinction for the present analysis, and hence the way I
will use these terms here, is that behavioral advertising depends
on large-scale and long-term collection, storage, analysis, and, in
some cases, sharing of data about Internet users, while
contextual advertising does not.
The Market for Behavioral Advertising

A.

There is a relative dearth of detailed public information
about the amount of behavioral advertising online, its
effectiveness for advertisers, and its implications for consumers.
The Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB) publishes some
statistics about advertising revenue. On the whole, Internet
advertising revenue increased approximately five-fold between
2002 and 2011.11 Approximately 47 percent of online advertising
revenue comes from search-related ads, which have dominated
revenue since at least 2006, when they accounted for 40 percent
of online advertising revenue. Google is responsible for a large
share of this advertising revenue1 2 (and a large share of Google's
revenue comes from search advertising). 13 Search advertising is
a mixture of contextual and behavioral advertising. 14 Display
ads, which are a mixture of run-of-network, contextual, and
behavioral ads, account for 22 percent of total revenues.15
A survey of online network advertising companies
sponsored by IAB in 200916 estimated that 18 percent of online
advertising revenue was attributable to behavioral targeting
and predicted that behavioral targeting would be responsible for

" See id at *10.
12 For this and additional information,

see Trefis, Google (2013),
https://www.trefis.com/company#/GOOG (visited Sept 15, 2013).
's

online at

See id.

See, for example, About Ads on Search, Gmail and across the Web, Google
Support (Google), online at http://support.google.com/websearchlbin/answer.py?hl=en
&answer-1634057 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
1
See Interactive Advertising Bureau, IAB Internet Advertising Revenue Report at
*12 (cited in note 10).
16 Howard Beales, The Value of Behavioral Targeting 3, 22 (Network Advertising
Initiative 2010), online at http://www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/BealesNA-Study
.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
1
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9 percent of total (online and offline) advertising spending in
2012. The 2009 IAB study estimated that rates charged for
behavioral advertising were about 2.7 times the rates for run-ofnetwork advertising but did not compare them to rates for
contextual advertising.17 Since run-of-network advertising is
placed without attempting to match ad to context, one would
expect that it would be cheaper than contextual advertising. It is
thus reasonable to assume that contextual advertising rates fall
somewhere between those for run-of-network and behavioral
advertising.
Despite the growth in online advertising revenue, rates for
online ads remain low relative to TV advertising and are
declining. For example, in 2012, the average CPM, or cost-perthousand-views, for online advertising was estimated at only
$2.66 for an online display ad compared to $24.68 for a TV ad.18
Joseph Turow, in a recent book providing a detailed look at
online advertising, describes how advertisers have been
relatively slow to move into online advertising because of
concerns about its effectiveness.19 Those concerns provided one
impetus for extensive data collection from visitors to online
sites, which was aimed at demonstrating ad effectiveness.2 0
There is little public data available comparing contextual
advertising to behavioral advertising. Many discussions of
online advertising conflate the two approaches and, in fact, they
are often combined in practice. One 2006 industry-sponsored
study reportedly found that consumers were more likely to
advertising than to behavioral
respond to contextual
2 1 however, an industry-sponsored study in 2007
advertising;
came to the opposite conclusion. 22 A 2012 study sponsored by

"

See id.

See Dan Mitchell, Online Ad Revenues Soar, But That's No Reason to Cheer, CNN
Money (CNN Dec 19, 2012), online at http:Iltech.fortune.cnn.com/2012/12/ 19/online-adrevenues-soar-but-thats-no-reason-to-cheer (visited Sept 15, 2013); Rebecca Greenfield,
The Decline of Google (and the Internet's)Ad Business, The Atlantic Wire (July 20, 2012),
http: //www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2012/07/decline-google-andat
online
internets-ad-business/54835 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
'9 Turow, The Daily You at 36 (cited in note 8).
20 See id at 50-58.
21 See Dawn Anfuso, Contextual vs. Behavioral Targeting, iMedia Connection (Mar
31, 2006), online at http: //www.imediaconnection.com/content/8863.asp (visited Sept 15,
2013).
22 See Behaviorally Targeted Online Advertising Gets Better Reception than
Contextual, Marketing Charts (Sept 12, 2007), online at http://www.marketingeharts.
18
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Google surveyed purchasers of online advertising and found that
82 percent of them used contextual advertising, while 71 percent
used behavioral advertising. 23 Various other percentages used
demographic, geographical, and retargeting strategies. The
majority of advertising buyers surveyed believed that behavioral
targeting would expand, while only 15 percent agreed that
behavioral targeting might be overhyped, though an additional
20 percent had not formed an opinion on that question. 24
There are many ways of charging for online advertising, and
the costs depend on many factors. On top of that, it is difficult to
measure the effectiveness of online advertising. Perhaps for this
reason, there seems to be no definitive answer as to whether
contextual or behavioral advertising gives advertisers a better
return on investment. Varied opinions on this subject abound on
marketing blogs and in newsletters. 25
B.

The Effectiveness of Behavioral Advertising

There are few direct studies of the effectiveness of
behavioral advertising, though its higher price certainly
suggests that advertisers value it more than run-of-network
advertising. The JAB 2009 study compared the conversion rates
(meaning the percentage of ad clicks that resulted in a sale) for
behavioral advertising with those of run-of-network ads, finding
(though with caveats in light of limited data) that the conversion

com/interactive/behaviorally-targeted-online-ads-get-better-reception-than-contextual1604/ (visited Sept 15, 2013).
" See Forrester Consulting, Display Media Buyers Value Audience in Context,
Think With Google (Sept 2012), online at http://www.thinkwithgoogle.com/insights/
library/studies /display-buyers-value-audience-in-context/ (visited Sept 15, 2013).
24 Id.
25 See, for example, Tessa Wegert, Contextual and Behavioral Targeting: Worth a
Try (ClickZ July 22, 2004), online at http://www.clickz.com/clickz/column/1696140/
contextual-behavioral-targeting-worth-try (visited Sept 15, 2013); Targeting Is The New
Killer App For Ad Networks (LucidMedia), online at http://www.lucidmedia.com/
blog/2008/09/22/targeting-the-new-killer-app-for-ad-networks/ (visited Sept 15, 2013);
K.C. Jones, Online BehavioralAds Beat Contextual Ads, Survey Says, (Information Week
September 13, 2007), online at http: /www.informationweek.com/online-behavioral-adsbeat-contextual-ad/201806110 (visited Sept 15, 2013); Marketers Peg Search, Behavioral
online
at
Feb
15,
2008),
Vox
as Best
ROI Deliverers (Marketing
http://www.marketingvox.com/marketers-peg-search-behavioral-as-best-roi-deliverers036658/ (visited Sept 15, 2013); Contextual Targeting Yields Highest Return for Brand
Advertisers (LucidMedia), online at http://www.lucidmedia.com/blog/2008/04/23/
contextual-targeting-highest-return-for-brands/ (visited Sept 15, 2013).
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rates for behaviorally targeted ads were nearly twice as high. 26
Again, no data for contextual advertising was available.
Avi Goldfarb and Catherine Tucker used a large dataset of
industry survey data in an attempt to quantify the effects of
behavioral targeting on ad effectiveness. 2 7 The industry survey
had measured ad effectiveness by asking Internet users about
the effects of viewing an online ad (versus a placebo ad) on their
expressed willingness to purchase. To attempt to disentangle the
specific impact of behavioral targeting, Goldfarb and Tucker
looked for changes in advertising effectiveness, as measured by
the survey, before and after the implementation of the European
Union (EU) Data Protection Directive, which was adopted in
2002 and implemented thereafter at various times in various
countries. 28 They assumed, but did not demonstrate, that
behavioral targeting decreased after the Directive's adoption.
They concluded from regression analysis that the effectiveness
of online advertising declined by about 65 percent after the
adoption of the Data Protection Directive. 29 The overall impact
of the ads was small both before and after enactment,
corresponding to about a 2.5 percent increase in expressed
willingness to purchase. 30 Without knowing to what extent
behavioral targeting actually decreased after the Directive was
adopted, it is a bit difficult to know what to make of these
results, though the authors attempted to rule out various
confounding factors. 31 Goldfarb and Tucker also found that the
decrease in effectiveness before and after the regulation was
mitigated for more context-specific ads, for multimedia ads, and

26 See Interactive Advertising Bureau, LAB Internet Advertising
Revenue Report at
*12 (cited in note 10).
1
See generally Avi Goldfarb and Catherine Tucker, PrivacyRegulation and Online
Advertising (2010), online at http: //papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1600259 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
28 European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data [1995] OJ L 281, 23/11 P. 0031-0050 ("Directive 95/46/EC").
29 Goldfarb and Tucker, Privacy Regulation and Online Advertising at 18 (cited in
note 27).
3
Id at 19.
31 Id at 21-27 (considering the effects of, for example, varying ad effectiveness
metrics, double exposure to the test ad, timing of each European country's
implementation of the Directive, country income, varying assumptions about timing of
the law's influence on advertisers, and attempting to rule out factors such as changes in
consumers' attitudes about online advertising).
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for larger ads.32 Thus, even if there was a causative chain
leading from the EU Directive to decreased behavioral targeting
to less effective advertising, the Goldfarb and Tucker study also
shows that there are alternatives to behavioral tracking that
companies might employ to improve ad effectiveness. 33
A study by Jun Yan, et al, examined data collected by a
commercial search engine to investigate the potential
effectiveness of behavioral targeting.34 That study is widely
quoted for its conclusion that "Click-Through Rate (CTR) of an
ad can be averagely improved as high as 670% by properly
segmenting users for behavioral targeted advertising in a
sponsored search." 35 The study's more detailed conclusions are
rarely mentioned, yet they call into question any general
inference about the effectiveness of behavioral targeting.
Yan, et al, investigated several approaches to targeting.
They compared "short term" targeting based on one day of
search queries with "long term" targeting based on one week's
worth of queries. 36 Interestingly, the most effective targeting
relied only on search queries collected over the one-day period.
Thus, Yan, et al, concluded that "user search behavior, i.e. user
search queries, can perform several times better than user
browsing behavior" and that "only tracking the short term user
behaviors [is] more effective than tracking the long term user
behaviors." 37 Notably,
the
widely-quoted
670 percent
improvement they observed was for targeting based on short
term collection of search queries. They predicted only about a
300 percent improvement when long-term tracking of search
queries was used. 38 In other words, tracking users for longer

32 Id at 29-30.
13 See Goldfarb and Tucker, Privacy Regulation and Online Advertising at 33 (cited
in note 27).
34 See generally Jun Yan, et al, How Much Can Behavioral Targeting Help Online
Advertising? *261-62 (WWW Conference Proceedings 2009 Madrid), online at
http://www.wwwconference.org/www2009/proceedings/pdflp261.pdf
(visited Sept 15,
2013).
3
Id at *261.
36 Id at *262, *267-68, *270.
" Id at *262.
3
Yan, et al, How Much Can Behavioral Targeting Help Online Advertising?
at*266, Figure 1 (cited in note 34) (showing that short term tracking based on search
query (labeled SQ) significantly outperformed long term tracking based on search query
(labeled LQ)).
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periods made targeting worse, perhaps because users'
purchasing interests change rapidly. 39
Rather than providing support for the ubiquitous and longterm data collection that is normally contemplated in
discussions of behavioral advertising, the Yan study suggests
that the most effective advertising is based on a user's search
queries over a relatively short period of time. From the
perspective of this article, advertising based on such short-term
tracking of search queries is essentially contextual.
C.

Consumer Perspectives on Behavioral Advertising

Information about the value of behaviorally targeted
advertising to consumers is also hard to come by. A well-known
survey by Turow, et al, 4 0 found that 66 percent of respondents
did not want to receive ads tailored to their interests, while even
larger percentages did not want ads to be tailored based on their
activities on the websites they were visiting (73 percent), what
they did on other websites (84 percent), or what they did offline
(86 percent). 41 A somewhat smaller fraction of respondents (66
percent) objected to receiving discounts based on their activities
on the websites they were currently visiting, but 81 percent
objected even to discounts if they were based on their activities
on other websites. 42 While younger respondents objected
somewhat less than older respondents to these forms of
targeting, the differences were not large. 43
A 2010 survey by Aleecia McDonald and Lorrie Cranor
found that 18 percent of respondents were "glad to have relevant
advertisements about things I am interested in instead of
random advertisements," while 64 percent agreed that "someone
keeping track of my activities online is invasive" and 40 percent
said they would be more careful online if they knew advertisers
were collecting data. 44 A recent interview-based study of
'

Id at *266.

Joseph Turow, et al, Contrary to What Marketers Say, Americans Reject Tailored
Advertising and Three Activities that Enable It *15 New York Times (NY Times Sept
2009), online at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdflbusiness/20090929-TailoredAdvertising.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
41 Id at *15, Tables 2 and 3.
42 Id at *18.
4 Id at *17.
4 Aleecia McDonald and Lorrie F. Cranor, Beliefs and Behaviors: Internet Users'
Understanding of Behavioral Advertising *21 (TPRC Aug 2010), online at
40
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consumer perceptions of online advertising found that
consumers thought that "non-obtrusive contextual ads were
particularly useful" but did not generally understand when the
advertising they were seeing was contextual and when it was
behaviorally targeted. 45 A 2010 study by Chris Hoofnagle, et al,
suggests that Internet users take some steps to protect their
privacy in response to behavioral advertising. 46 Fifty percent of
survey respondents reported reading privacy policies "often" or
"sometimes," 63 percent reported erasing cookies "often" or
"sometimes," and 56 percent reported having changed their
minds about one or more online purchases because of privacy or
security concerns. 47
Despite their concerns about online data collection, few
Internet users respond by eschewing advertising-supported
online products and services. In the McDonald and Cranor
study, for example, only 15 percent of respondents reported that
behavioral advertising would stop them from using a site. 48
Surveys reporting strong concern about privacy among
consumers have been criticized on several grounds, including
that they do not reflect the tradeoffs that consumers are willing
to make in exchange for free access to online products and
services. 49 The fact that users continue to subject themselves to
online tracking despite expressing discomfort about it is one
basis for the argument that users accept online data collection
as a price paid for access to online products and services.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1989092## (visited Sept 15, 2013).
4 Blas6 Ur, et al, Smart, Useful, Scary, Creepy: Perceptionsof Online Behavioral
Advertising *5 (CyLab Carnegie Mellon University July 2012), online at
http://cups.cs.cmu.edulsoups/2012/proceedings/a4_Ur (visited Sept 15, 2013).
46 Chris Hoofnagle, et al, How Different Are Young Adults from Older Adults When
it Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes and Policies? *13 Tables 6-8 (Federal Trade
online at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/privacy
Commission Apr 14, 2010),
roundtable/544506-00125.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013) ("How Different Are Young Adults
from Older Adults").
47

Id.

McDonald and Cranor, Beliefs and Behaviors at *22 (cited in note 44).
4 See, for example, Szoka, Privacy Polls v. Real-World Tradeoffs at *5-7 (cited in
note 3); Thierer, Unappreciated Benefits of Advertising & Commercial Speech at *2-3
(cited in note 3).
4'
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II. CONSUMER PREFERENCES AND ADVERTISING BASED
BUSINESS MODELS

The most common normative justification for a market
economy rests on the basic idea that payments signal
preferences. Consumers' willingness to pay particular prices
signals their preferences for particular products and services
and, if all goes well, the market responds by producing products
and services responsive to those preferences. Notably, payment
of a particular price functions as a preference signal only
because the transfer of money from consumer to producer ties
greater consumer willingness to pay to higher producer revenue.
In other words, what motivates sellers to meet consumer
preferences is not that consumers will pay more (consumer
disutility) for products they prefer, but that sellers will receive
more for offering preferred products.
The story often told about zero-price advertising-based
business models (in the online or offline world) is that
consumers "pay" something other than money for the content or
services they receive. So, for example, the traditional broadcast
advertising-based approach is sometimes modeled as one in
which consumers pay for television or radio content with
"attention" to advertising. The assumption underlying such
models is that content recipients experience some disutility from
being subjected to broadcast advertising5 0 but are willing to
incur that cost because it is outweighed by the expected benefit
of the programming itself.
The casual analogy between "payment" and costs incurred
by consumers subjected to advertising does not go very far,
however. Free advertising-supported business models sacrifice
the direct connection between consumer payment and producer
revenue that ordinarily makes the market responsive to
consumer preferences. An advertising-supported company's

0 See, for example, Simon Anderson and Stephen Coate, Market Provision of
Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis, 72 Rev Econ Stud 947, 950-52 (2005). It is also
possible to model the situation as one in which consumers receive positive utility from
advertising. See, for example, David Godes, Ellie Ofek, and Miklos Sarvary, Content us.
Advertising: The Impact of Competition on Media Firm Strategy, 28 Marketing Sci 20,
31-33 (2009). I will return to this possibility a bit in Part II, but, for the most part, I
make the more plausible assumption that broadcast advertising is experienced by
consumers mostly as a disutility or cost. This assumption is strongly supported by the
empirical fact that consumers go to great lengths to avoid broadcast advertising, at least
in the television context.
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revenue comes, by definition, from the monetary price that
advertisers are willing to pay, which provides a direct signal of
advertiser preferences. Consumer preferences are signaled to
providers only indirectly and only to the extent that advertisers'
preferences are accurate proxies for consumer preferences. The
price that an advertiser is willing to pay to advertise its
products in conjunction with a "free" offering depends on how
many additional sales it expects the advertising to generate.
There is only a loose connection between advertiser willingness
to pay and the strength of consumer preferences for the "free"
offering. Because they break the direct connection between price
and consumer preferences, the social value of business models
bundling advertising with unrelated goods and services must be
explained.
Arguments for the social value of advertising-supported
business models are primarily of three kinds. The first type of
argument contends that advertising itself is beneficial to
consumers because it lowers the costs of searching for
transaction partners.5 1 The second asserts that bundling
advertising with a particular product or service solves some kind
of failure in the market for that product or service. 52 The third,
commonly heard from industry advocates, contends that free
products and services are positive externalities associated with
advertising. 53 This Part discusses the effects of broadcast, online
contextual, and behaviorally targeted ad-supported business
models on consumer markets.
A.

The Basic Economics of Advertising-Based Business Models

The economics of advertising is a complicated, and
incompletely understood, subject, and I certainly make no

s" See generally George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J Pol Econ 213
(1961) (offering a classic statement of this argument).
52 See, for example, J.H. Snider, The Myth of "Free" TV *13-14
(New America
Foundation Spectrum Series
Working Paper #5
June 2002), online at
http://www.newamerica.net/files/ nafmigration/Pub File_877-1.pdf (visited Sept 15,
2013) (describing how free TV started as an "economic necessity" for broadcasters).
' See, for example, Michael R. Hammock and Paul H. Rubin, Applications Want to
be Free: Privacy Against Information, 7 Competition Pol Intl 41, 48-49 (2011); IAB
Europe, Consumers Driving the Digital Uptake *11, *19 (IAB Europe Sept 2010), online
at http://www.iabeurope.eulmedia/95855/white-paperconsumersdriving-the-digital
uptake.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
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attempt to do it complete justice here. 54 Instead, this section
draws out aspects of the subject relevant to the point of this
Article, which is that the behavioral advertising business model
that is becoming the norm online is problematic not only from
the perspective of privacy, but also because of its effects on the
basic functioning of the market in responding to consumer
preferences.
1.

Theories of the function of advertising.

There are a variety of theories of the role of advertising in
the marketplace.5 5 One influential thread of analysis views
advertising as primarily informational and takes an economic
perspective.5 6 The neoclassical theory of the market begins by
assuming that all players have perfect information in the
following sense: all producers of goods are presumed to have
perfect information about the aggregate preferences of
consumers (as represented generally by a demand curve), while
all consumers are presumed to have perfect information about
the characteristics of the goods offered for sale and their prices.
The theory also assumes, often implicitly, that consumers have
perfect information about where to purchase the available goods.
Under these highly idealized conditions, a competitive market
will lead to a good with particular characteristics being offered
to consumers at a single market-clearing price equal to the
marginal cost of producing the good. 57 The fact that neither
consumers nor producers have this kind of perfect information
throws a monkey wrench into neoclassical theory.5 8
5 For a review of the economic literature, see generally Kyle Bagwell, The
Economic Analysis of Advertising (Columbia University Dept of Econ Discussion Paper
2005),
online at http://www.stanford.edul-kbagwell/BagwellWeb/
Series Aug
adchapterPost082605.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013). See also Jess Benhabib and Alberto
Bisin, Social Construction of Preferences: Advertising, 1 Handbook of Soc Econ 201
(2011); Justin P. Johnson and David P. Myatt, On the Simple Economics of Advertising,
Marketing, and Product Design, 96 Am Econ Rev 756 (2006). For an overview in the
online context, see generally Evans, 23 J Econ Persp 37 (cited in note 6).
5 For an overview, see Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising at 6-24
(cited in note 54).
56 See generally Stigler, The Economics of Information (cited in note 51).
5 See, for example, E. Roy Weintraub, Neoclassical Economics (The Concise
Encylopedia of Economics), online at http://www.econlib.org/library/Encl/Neoclassical
Economics.html (visited on May 12, 2013); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information (The Concise
Encyclopedia of Economics), online at http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Information
.html (visited on May 12, 2013).
r See Stiglitz, 47 Am Econ at 8-9 (cited in note 4); Stiglitz, 48 Am Econ at 17-18
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The lack of perfect market information means, among other
things, that the information necessary to match buyers and
sellers and to allow for price competition is costly for both buyers
and sellers to obtain, adding transaction cost friction to the
operation of the market. One way to view advertising, as
discussed in the seminal work of George Stigler, is as a
mechanism for reducing search costs by providing information to
consumers about the characteristics and prices of goods
available from various sellers.5 9 By reducing search costs,
advertising facilitates both transaction matchmaking and price
competition. Related theories about the function of advertising
(and, more specifically, of brand recognition or seller reputation)
in markets for experience goods (goods whose qualities can be
evaluated only after purchase) and credence goods (goods whose
qualities consumers are unable to evaluate even after purchase)
hold that advertising may serve to lower search costs by
informing consumers that a product is available from a
trustworthy seller. 60
There are, of course, other theories of advertising, which can
be grouped under the rubric of advertising as persuasion.6 1
Under these theories, the purpose of advertising is to shift
consumer demand by persuading consumers to buy a particular
product with particular characteristics, rather than to reduce
the transaction costs of matching consumers to those selling
products that fit their pre-existing preferences. 62
At one extreme, some commentators view persuasive
advertising as manipulating and overriding consumers'
preferences using various tactics such as associating the
advertised goods with desirable experiences or traits such as
(cited in note 4). See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic
Analysis, 64 Econ Rev 1 (1974).
9 See Stigler, The Economics of Information (cited in note 51); Randal C. Picker,
Online Advertising, Identity, and Privacy *9-10, *18 (U Chi Law & Econ Olin Working
Paper No 475 June 2009), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1428065 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
6
See, for example, Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising at 18-19 (cited
in note 54); P. Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J Pol Econ 729, 732, 752 (1974); P.
Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J Pol Econ. 311, 327 (1970).
61 See generally Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark
Consumer, 23 Berkeley Tech L J 1227 (2008) (providing a recent review); Johnson and
Myatt, 96 Am Econ Rev 756 (cited in note 54); Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of
Advertising (cited in note 54).
62 See Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising at 13 (cited in note
54);
Johnson and Myatt, 96 Am Econ Rev at 756-57 (cited in note 54).
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freedom, adventure, or sexuality or promoting misleading (if still
legal) impressions about the quality of the goods or the effects
they are likely to have on the lives of consumers. 63 Persuasive
advertising is also viewed more benignly by some theorists. They
argue, for example, that the emotional connection with a product
promoted by persuasive advertising increases consumer utility
or that persuasive advertising assists consumers in realigning
their preferences when new products become available. Those
who prefer not to speak of shifting consumer preferences may
contend that persuasive advertising helps consumers to
understand that a new product aligns with their pre-existing
preferences. 64 The latter view blurs into the search cost theory.
There is a debate about the extent to which the information
provided by advertising provides net social benefits. Some
commentators argue that much of the money expended on
advertising is devoted to artificial product differentiation in
service of a rent-seeking quest to grab market share from other
sellers.6 5 Some also argue that advertising raises consumer
prices.6 6
Of course, neither buyers nor sellers will want to invest
time or money in advertising that does not succeed in
facilitating desirable market transactions. If consumers are
subjected to advertising that does not inform them about
products of interest or persuade them to make purchases they
are happy to have made, they will incur costs in terms of wasted
attention, disruption, displeasure, and in some circumstances,
regret at having made undesirable purchases. Consumers even
may incur costs when they receive advertising for products they
intend to purchase if, for example, they are sufficiently familiar
with those products that the advertising provides no reduction
in their transaction costs.

63 See generally Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising at 10,
24-25 (cited
in note 54); Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer at 1253-54 (cited
in note 61).
64 See generally Bagwell The Economic Analysis of Advertising at 20-23 (cited in
note 54); Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer at 1255-59 (cited in
note 61);
r Compare Benhabib and Bisin, 1 Handbook of Soc Econ at 210 (cited in note 54)
and Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising at *6 (cited in note 54), with Picker,
Online Advertising, Identity, and Privacy at *19-20 (cited in note 59).
6
See Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising at *6 (cited in note 54).
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To summarize, without taking sides in the persuasion
versus search cost debate, we can expect that advertisers' and
consumers' interests are aligned at least to the extent that both
consumers and advertisers are interested in 1) reducing
transaction costs by delivery of product information to
consumers and 2) making better "matches" between the
advertising consumers receive and the products and services
they are interested in buying. It is equally clear, however, that
consumers' and advertisers' interests are not perfectly aligned.
In particular, advertisers will be less sensitive than consumers
to the disutility imposed on consumers by ads that do not
facilitate the satisfaction of their preferences. Those who find
the persuasion theory convincing (which certainly seems to
include advertising industry players) might argue further that
consumers' and advertisers' interests are misaligned to the
extent that advertising persuades consumers either to purchase
items that do not increase their utility or to adapt their
preferences in sub-optimal ways. Thus, persuasion theorists
might argue that consumers incur costs when advertising
persuades them to spend money on cigarettes, gambling,
pornography, penis enlargements, sub-prime mortgages, or
anything else that they regret purchasing or that otherwise
decreases their utility. Advertisers do not internalize such
consumer costs.
2.

Advertising-based business models and "two-sided
markets."

From the search cost perspective, advertising is valuable to
both producers and consumers, and, in principle, both producers
and consumers should be willing to invest in intermediaries that
target advertisements to those who are likely to be interested in
them.6 7 One way that an intermediary can do that is to
aggregate advertisements from sellers of related goods in one
platform, so that interested consumers know where to look. A
simple example of such a platform is a bulletin board in an
apartment building on which residents post information about
their interest in buying or selling services or goods likely to be
But see Mark Patterson, On the Impossibility of Information Intermediaries
(Fordham Law and Economics Research Paper No 13 July 2001), online at
(visited Sept 15, 2013)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=276968
(exploring the issues raised by information intermediaries).
67
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relevant to other residents. Pennysaver publications have served
a similar role in local communities for years. Craigslist.com is
an updated version of such a platform.
Markets involving intermediaries that reduce the costs of
transactions between two groups are commonly described as
"two-sided markets" or "two-sided platforms."68 In a canonical
two-sided market, the intermediary serves the interdependent
needs of two groups of customers. In the offline world, shopping
malls and swap meets are two-sided market intermediaries.
Online auction sites such as eBay.com, job sites, such as
monster.com, literal matchmaking sites, such as match.com, and
restaurant delivery and reservation sites, such as seamless.com
and opentable.com, are more contemporary examples. Two-sided
market intermediaries are responsive (though not necessarily
equally responsive) to the preferences of both types of customers,
who have a mutual interest in reducing the transaction costs of
their interactions. 69 A simple platform for matching buyers and
sellers, such as the Pennysaver or craigslist.com, is a two-sided
market intermediary for advertising.
The typical advertising-supported business is not a simple
two-sided market intermediary for matching buyers and sellers,
however. While there are some similar features, something else
is going on. The majority of these businesses bundle advertising
from a group of sellers with another product or service, which
this Article will call the "associated good." Common examples of
associated goods are entertainment or news content or, in the
online context, search or social networking services. In most
cases, it is the associated good, not the advertising, that
consumers want. Thus, the ad-supported business is not serving
as an intermediary reducing transaction costs for two parties
with interdependent preferences.

6
See, for example, Anderson and Coate, 72 Rev Econ Studies at 955 (cited in note
50); David S. Evans, Two-Sided Platforms and Analysis of Single-Firm Conduct *2-4
(FTC Sept 2006), online at http://ftc.gov/os/comments/section2hearings/522292-00012.pdf
(visited Sept 15, 2013); Markus Reisinger, Platform Competition for Advertisers and
Users in Media Markets *1-5 (Otto Beisheim School of Management, CESifo May 29,
2011),
online
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1855287&
download=yes (visited Sept 15, 2013); Glen E. Weyl, A Price Theory of Multi-Sided
Platforms, 100 Am Econ Rev 1642, 1644-45 (2010); Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean
Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J Eur Econ Assoc 990, 991-93
(2003).
69 See David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets,
20 Yale J Reg 325, 339-44 (2003).
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Bundled advertising-based business models can be divided
into two types. In one type, which includes newspapers and
magazines, both consumers and advertisers pay the producer of
the bundle. 70 Advertisers (who generally pay more) pay to have
their advertisements delivered to consumers in a format that
gets attention from prospective purchasers. Consumers pay to
receive the bundle, generally because they value the associated
good. Consumer attitudes toward the advertisements may vary,
however, with some valuing the advertising and being willing to
pay more for the bundle than they would for the associated good
alone and others perceiving the advertising as a cost and being
willing to pay somewhat less for the bundle than they would for
the associated good alone. In the second type, which includes
broadcast media and many online advertising-supported
businesses, advertisers pay the full cost of the bundle while
consumers receive access to it for a zero monetary price.
Price asymmetries in two-sided markets often are explained
by two common features of such markets: 1) differences in the
extent to which the two types of customers value the services
provided by the .intermediary and in their elasticity of demand
and 2) the fact that the two groups of customers place different
values on attracting customers of the other sort.7 1 In essence, if
one group of customers is willing to subsidize the participation
of the other group, providers of intermediary services may be
able to increase their total profits by arbitraging their costs
between the two groups, charging the first group more than the
marginal costs associated with serving them and the second
group less.
Similar factors are at work in the bundled advertising-based
business model, in that advertisers are interested enough in
reaching consumers that they are willing to foot the bill for the
associated good. Thus, for example, traditional broadcast
advertisers strongly prefer that their ads reach large numbers of
consumers. They generally face fixed costs from designing and
placing an ad, while their net revenue from advertisinginfluenced purchases increases with the number of "eyeballs"
exposed to the ad. For this reason, advertisers are willing to pay
See, for example, id at 337 (giving examples of sources of platform revenue).
See id at 342-45 (describing how price is determined in a two-sided market);
Evans, Two-Sided Platforms and Analysis of Single-Firm Conduct at *4-5 (cited in note
68) (same).
70
71
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an extra amount per consumer so that broadcasters can lower
the price consumers pay, thus increasing their numbers. Indeed,
advertisers apparently are willing to pay enough to subsidize
the production of broadcast content to attract consumers to the
platform.
Another way to look at asymmetric pricing in both canonical
two-sided markets and advertising-supported business models is
that each of the intermediary's customers bases its willingness
to pay for the intermediary's services on the package the
intermediary delivers to it. Thus, advertisers see, and are
willing to pay for, the package of potential customers reached by
the advertisements. The intermediary's bundle of advertising
and content can improve the package of potential buyers both by
increasing the raw numbers of eyeballs and by targeting
consumers who are likely to purchase the advertised products.
Consumers, on the other hand, see the intermediary as offering
a package of content and advertising. Their willingness to pay
(in money and in time) reflects the composition of the package.
Consumers' demand for the bundle increases when the
associated content meets their preferences and decreases if
there are too many ads or if they do not find the ads useful.
An advertising intermediary tries to balance all of these
factors in setting its prices to advertisers and consumers. The
bundling strategy allows the intermediary to offer the associated
content to consumers for a lower price, thus increasing
consumer demand (as long as consumers do not find the
advertising too distasteful) for the bundle of content and
advertising. Higher consumer demand makes advertisers happy
because their advertisements are received by more consumers.
The supramarginal cost price to advertisers also decreases
advertiser demand, thus making consumers happier (assuming
they do not want too many ads bundled with their content). At
some combination of content, advertising, and prices, the
intermediary maximizes its expected profits.
While there are similarities between advertising-supported
businesses and two-sided market intermediaries, the bundling of
advertising with an associated good complicates things, as
already mentioned. While the social benefits are clear when a
two-sided market intermediary reduces transaction costs for two
groups seeking to satisfy interdependent preferences, the social
benefits of bundling advertising with an associated good are less
evident. While buyers and sellers may have interdependent
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preferences for advertising's role in reducing their transaction
costs, the same is not true for associated goods, such as media
content. There is no general reason why these associated goods
could not be sold independently in an ordinary paid market. The
social value of the advertising-based business model must be
assessed in comparison to the social value of separate markets
for advertising and for the associated good. 72
The proliferation of free-to-consumer advertising-supported
business models also needs further explanation. While price
asymmetry may be expected, a price of zero is not inevitable.
Indeed, advertising-based print media traditionally have not
settled on a price to consumers of zero. On average, at least as
reported in 2003, consumers provided 20 percent of print media
revenue. 73 As already mentioned, there also are some
advertising platforms that do not involve an associated good. For
consumers, the bundling of advertising with an associated good
model reflects a tradeoff: a paid market provides associated
goods more responsive to consumer preferences and subjects
them to fewer undesirable ads, while the free ad-supported
business model gives them lower priced associated goods but
subjects them to more advertising. The fact that most consumer
goods are not sold via free advertising-supported businesses
suggests a need to explain why and when the tradeoff will favor
the advertising-supported business model.
3.

The consumer tradeoff in the broadcast context.

Prior to the rise of the online businesses that are the focus
of this Article, the zero-price advertising-supported business
model was associated primarily with the delivery of broadcast
entertainment and news "content."74 Broadcast content has
several special features that explain its historical association
with the zero-price
advertising-based
approach.
Most
importantly, the market for broadcast content suffers from a
free rider problem. Though the marginal costs of distributing

72 See generally Luchetta, Is the Google Platform a Two-Sided Market? (cited in
note 1) (making a similar point).
73
See Evans, 20 Yale J Reg at 337 (cited in note 69) (noting approximately 80
percent of newspaper revenue comes from advertisers).
1 See, for example, Snider, The Myth of "Free" TV at *13-14 (cited in note 52)
(describing how free TV started as an "economic necessity" for broadcasters). See also
Turow, The Daily You at 21, 114, 163 (cited in note 8).
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broadcast content are low, the fixed costs of producing it are
high. The usual response to such free rider problems is
intellectual property, which gives producers exclusive rights so
that they can charge supramarginal cost prices. In the broadcast
context, however, the transaction costs of collecting revenue
from viewers of broadcast media would be prohibitive even if
viewers were willing to pay enough to cover the fixed costs of
producing content. Programs broadcast over the airwaves can be
tapped by anyone with the proper equipment. There is no easy
way for broadcasters to trace the recipients of their broadcasts
and bill them for the particular programming they access. The
zero-price advertising-based model solves this free rider
problem. Advertisers value "eyeballs" enough to be willing to
absorb the fixed costs of producing the content that is broadcast
with their advertising. To the extent that audience preferences
for content predict their interest in particular products,
advertising and content can be coordinated so as to improves the
targeting of advertising The model provides consumers with
content that they are willing to watch, even though it is not
directly responsive to their preferences and they may incur some
disutility from the advertising.7 5
The advertising-supported model is far from a perfect
means of meeting consumer preferences for entertainment,
however.7 6 Advertisers prefer whatever bundle of content and
advertising results in the highest revenue from purchases of
their advertised goods. Advertisers have two basic strategies for
increasing advertising's impact on their net revenue-targeting
the bundled content to those consumers most likely to purchase
the advertisers' goods and increasing the sheer numbers of
consumers exposed to the ads. The broadcast industry invests
heavily in measuring and defining the audiences for particular
programming and optimizing the bundle of content and ads.7 7
Nonetheless, the free broadcast advertising-based business
7
The social utility of this tradeoff has been the subject of considerable debate. See,
for example, Edwin C. Baker, Giving the Audience What it Wants, 58 Ohio St L J 311,
316-18 (1997); Edwin C. Baker, The Media that Citizens Need, 147 U Pa L Rev 317, 37780 (1998). See generally Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and EditorialIntegrity, 85
Tex L Rev 83 (2006). See also Snider, The Myth of "Free" TVat *16-18 (cited in note 52)
(arguing that network TV is actually highly subsidized by government).
76 See, for example, Picker, Online Advertising, Identity, and Privacy at *21-22
(cited in note 59).
n For an extensive discussion of these strategies, see Turow, The Daily You at 2130 (cited in note 8).

118

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2013

model is relatively constrained in its ability to employ the
targeting strategy, in part because the limited number of
broadcast channels favors the strategy of increasing audience
size. To attract a large number of viewers, a television program
must appeal to a wide swath of viewers, meaning that products
advertised can be expected to be relatively generic and
associated content can be expected to have broad, mainstream,
appeal. 8 Content demanded by broadcast advertisers will not
satisfy the preferences of consumers who would prefer to pay
directly (even at intellectual property-based supramarginal
prices) for more specialized or higher quality content.
Broadcast media also are less than perfect advertising
intermediaries from the consumer perspective. Broadcast
advertising is delivered to many consumers who are not
interested in receiving it. Many of those consumers take costly
steps to avoid advertising by using simple mechanisms, such as
going to the kitchen for popcorn during commercial breaks or
switching radio stations or, more recently, by investing in adskipping technologies, such as remote controls, VCRs, and
DVRs. 9 In response, broadcasters and advertisers have tried to
maximize ad effectiveness by adjusting the lengths and timing
of commercials and commercial breaks. In 1965, a commercial
break consisted of one or two sixty-second commercials.80 Over
time, sixty-second commercials were largely replaced by thirtysecond and fifteen-second spots. 8 ' The lengths of commercial
breaks, now incorporating several spots, stretched from sixty
seconds in 1965 to three or four minutes in 2007-2008.82 Brand
appearances were incorporated into programming.8 3 The total

See Edwin C. Baker, An Economic Critique of Free Trade in Media Products, 78
NC L Rev 1357, 1381-84 (2000) (discussing, in the international context, the trade-offs
between wide appeal and local appeal).
7
See, for example, Kenneth C. Wilbur, How the Digital Video Recorder (DVR)
Changes TraditionalTelevision Advertising, 37 J Advertising 143, 143-44 (2008).
a Television Bureau of Advertising, TV Basics *17 (TVB July 2012), online at
http://www.tvb.org/nedialfile/TV_ Basics.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
78

81

Id.

See David A. Schweidel and Robert J. Kent, Predictors of the Gap Between
Program and Commercial Audiences: An Investigation Using Live Tuning Data, 74 J
Marketing 18, 24 (2010).
3 See, for example, Kantar Media Reports, U.S. Advertising Expenditures Increased
6.5 Percent in 2010, Press Release (Mar 17, 2011), online at http://kantarmediana.com/
intelligence/press/us-advertising-expenditures-increased-65-percent-2010
(visited Sept
15, 2013).
82
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amount of time devoted to advertising increased from nine
minutes per hour in the 1960s to an average of about twenty-two
minutes per hour in 2010.84
Advertisers also have experimented with various methods
to subvert viewer ad avoidance, such as interspersing
advertisements at intervals so that consumers have to make
more effort to avoid them, making ads short so that avoiding
them is less worthwhile, and making commercial breaks longer
so that fast forwarding of recorded programs is less effective. 5
Though some of these efforts by advertisers have independent
social value (the entertainment value of some television
commercials comes to mind), for the most part the costs of this
arms race between advertisers and viewers are a socially
wasteful side effect of the bundling of content with advertising.
A broadcast market that offers only bundled advertising
and content thus has social costs. Excess advertising is imposed
on some consumers who would prefer to get their advertising
elsewhere (or not at all). Broadcast content offerings are
distorted by the imperfect alignment between advertiser
demand and consumer preferences. 86
Technological changes have made the shortcomings of the
bundled product of advertising and broadcast content evident.
New delivery methods have reduced the transaction costs of
selling media content directly to consumers. Many consumers
are willing to pay for ad-free (or ad-light) content via
subscription models or, increasingly, via purchases of individual
programs, using intermediaries such as HBO, Showtime,
Netflix, and Amazon. While some purchased programs are
simply ad-free or ad-light versions of broadcast programming,8 7
a significant amount of paid content is substantively different

84

Id.

8
See, for example, Wilbur, 37 J Advertising at 144-46 (cited in note 79); Daniel
Franker, The End of the 2-Minute Commercial Break, The Wrap (June 17, 2009), online
at http://www.thewrap.com/tv/article/standard-ad-pods-disappearing-tv 3733 (visited
Sept 15, 2013); Herbert Rotfeld, Understanding Advertising Clutter and the Real
Solution to Declining Audience Attention to Mass Media Commercial Messages, 23 J
Consumer Marketing 180 (2006).
8
Commentators, such as Baker, 58 Ohio St L J at 319 (cited in note 78), have also
pointed to other problems with the model from a social perspective, but those are not my
focus here.
a Amazon and Netflix, for example, make single episodes of many popular network
television shows available for purchase.
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from broadcast content 8 8 and presumably reflects the
preferences of paying viewers better than the free advertisingsupported broadcast content does. Technology also has made it
possible for television to deliver a greater variety of specialized
content and for content providers both to monitor the viewing
habits of consumers and to send them more specifically targeted
ads.89 Of course, even today, enough consumers watch the
traditional broadcast bundle of content and advertising to make
investment in the broadcast bundle worth advertisers' while.90
Nonetheless, there is heated debate about the future of
broadcast advertising-supported television in light of these
pressures from both sides.9 1
The fact that a paid market for content better reflects the
preferences of paying consumers does not, of course, tell us
which model is socially preferable. The paid model restricts
access by comparison to a free ad-supported model. There is
longstanding debate in the intellectual property context about
the need to balance the social benefits of using exclusive rights
to incentivize the production of content against the social costs
of restricting access to information goods that could be
distributed at nearly zero marginal cost. 92 The zero-price,
broadcast-advertising-based business model solves the free rider
problem without restricting access but reduces responsiveness to
consumer preferences for content and imposes disutility
associated with advertising.

8
Premium cable stations, such as HBO and Showtime, offer ad-free programming
by subscription, some of which is later sold in single episode format by Amazon and
Netflix.
89 Turow, The Daily You at 30-32 (cited in note 8).
9 See Interactive Advertising Bureau, IAB Internet Advertising Revenue Report at
*20 (cited in note 10) (noting that broadcast television maintains highest advertising
revenue of all advertising supported media); TV Basics at *2, *4 (cited in note 80).
9" See, for example, John Osborn, The Next Business Model for Ad-Supported TV?,
AdAge Media (AdAge Feb 20, 2009), online at http://adage.com/article/media [businessmodel-advertising-supported-tv/134746 (visited Sept 15, 2013); Tess Vigeland, The
Future of TV A Pay-Per-Network Model?, Marketplace Tech (Marketplace Nov 9, 2012),
online at http: /www.marketplace.org/topics/tech/future-tv-pay-network-model
(visited
Sept 15, 2013); Julia Boorstin, What Do "Cable Nevers" Mean for TV's Future?, CNBC
Media
and
Entertainment
Reporter
(CNBC
Jan
8,
2013),
online
at
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100362995/WhatDo039CableNevers039_Mean-forTVO39s_F
uture (visited Sept 15, 2013); Brian Barrett, The Future of TV May Not Be Worth It,
Gizmodo (Gizmodo Jan 2, 2013), online at http://gizmodo.com/5972517/the-future-of-tvmay-not-be-worth-it (visited Sept 15, 2013).
92 See generally Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to
Get Beyond
Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L Rev 970 (2012).
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In theory, a complete switch to a paid model for content
delivery might also leave unmet demand for an advertising
intermediary, though in the current technological context, there
seems to be little standing in the way of the development of
stand-alone platforms for matching advertising to consumers if
there is a demand for them.9 3
The future may well be a mixed market, in which
consumers choose between paid programming and advertisingsupported programming according to their preferences and their
pocketbooks. In this sense, consumer disutility from advertising
and from lower quality content (in the sense that it is less
responsive to consumer preferences) is price-like, in that it
determines the point at which consumers will switch to paid
programming. Though consumer disutility from advertising is
not transferred to broadcast media providers as a payment, it
signals their preferences to the extent that advertiser
willingness to pay reflects how successfully advertisingsupported content competes with paid content in attracting
audiences.
The indirect signal of consumer preferences is a reasonably
good one in the broadcast context because consumers can
estimate their expected net utility from the bundle of
advertising and content fairly accurately. They have plenty of
experience with commercials and thus can estimate the expected
disutility imposed by commercial breaks. They can compare the
extent to which paid and broadcast offerings meet their
preferences for content. They can also estimate the costs and
benefits of advertising-avoidance strategies (and technologies)
reasonably well. Consumers may underestimate the indirect
costs of advertising, such as the potential for regret following an
advertising-induced purchase or undesirable molding of
preferences, but their extensive previous experience with
advertising, along with existing consumer protection regulation,
limits those effects.

9
In addition to Craigslist, something like this is offered at sites like hotels.com,
bizrate.com, techbargains.com, and a host of others. Such sites may be less popular with
advertisers than platforms that allow them exclusive access to a group of consumers, but
they foster price competition between brands while reducing consumer search costs, thus
coming closer to the ideal of the search costs theory of advertising.
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B. The Contextual Advertising Business Model for Online
Products and Services
The online environment changes the calculus in five
important ways. First, the Internet and other digital
technologies have decreased the costs of producing and
delivering content significantly, at least in some cases. Second,
the interactivity of the online context facilitates the delivery of a
wide variety of online products and services, only some of which
are content in the traditional sense of broadcast media. Third,
the online environment greatly decreases the costs to consumers
of searching for content and for other products and services,
whether those products and services are digital or not. These
three factors underlie the online contextual advertising business
model, which is discussed in this section. Fourth, the
interactivity of the online context makes it technically feasible
(through various means, such as cookies) to serve different
advertisements to different consumers alongside the same
product or service. 94 This feature makes possible the behavioral
advertising business model, which is discussed in the next
section. Finally, the interactivity of the online digital context
means that paid business models are technically feasible
alternatives to advertising-based business models, just as in the
emerging market for paid media content.
Because of its lower production and delivery costs and
interactivity, the online environment has produced an explosion
of "channels" of specialized content and services (websites, blogs,
and so forth), much of which is produced by Internet users.9 5
This content-based segmentation of users opens the door for
specialized advertising keyed to the particular audiences each
online product attracts. The proliferation and dynamic evolution
of niche websites produces two new issues, however. First, the
transaction costs of matching specialized advertising to
specialized content on the Internet may be significant. Second,
even relatively specialized advertisers will want to spread the
costs of creating their ads over as many potential purchasers as
possible and so will probably want to post their ads on more

9
For a detailed discussion of means for tailoring and serving advertising, see
Turow, The Daily You at 47-53 (cited in note 8).
1
See Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms
Markets and Freedom 50-58 (Yale 2006).
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than one website. These factors led to the rise of a new kind of
advertising intermediary. Rather than producing content to be
bundled with advertising, these companies use computer
algorithms, often based on keywords, to match online content
and services to advertisers.9 6
Contextual advertising intermediaries can accommodate
many more, and more specialized, advertisers than broadcast
content providers can accommodate because they need not
invest in producing the content that surrounds the advertising
slots they sell. Instead, contextual advertising intermediaries
match advertisers to the wide variety of website contexts
available on the Internet, acting as canonical two-sided market
websites.
These
for
advertisers
and
intermediaries
intermediaries' investments in developing matching strategies
can be recouped with revenue from advertising spread across
hundreds or thousands of diverse, and frequently specialized,
"channels."
Contextual advertising intermediaries are incentivized to
invest in matching ads accurately to consumer interests by
revenue models such as "pay per click," in which advertisers pay
according to the number of "clicks" their ads receive. "Pay per
click" and similar models presumably couple intermediary
revenues more closely to the effectiveness of their ad targeting
than does payment based only on ad placement.
Like all advertising-supported business models, the
contextual advertising model does not reflect consumer
preferences directly. Nonetheless, the associated products and
services supported by the online contextual advertising-based
business model may be more closely tied to Internet user
preferences than the content supported by the broadcast model
for several reasons. First, the ability to serve specialized ads in a
large number of specialized contexts, coupled with the relatively
low costs of producing many online products and services, should
lead to a wider variety of ad-supported "channels" online than in
9
See, for example, Evans, 23 J Econ Persp at 41-43 (cited in note 6) (describing
the difference between the traditional approach, involving content creation, and the
online contextual advertising approach); Turow, The Daily You (cited in note 8)
(describing Google's AdSense contextual advertising program); Andrew Hatch, Abraham
Bagherjeiran, and Adwait Ratnaparkhi, Clickable Terms for Online Contextual
Advertising (ADKDD July 10, 2010), online at http:I/users.cis.fiu.edul-zhenOOl/
activities/KDD USBkey 2010/workshops/WO8%20ADKDD10/15.pdf (visited Sept 15,
2013) (discussing algorithms for determining the relevance of an ad to a particular
online site).
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the broadcast context. The profile of ad-supported online
offerings thus should reflect a more diverse palette of consumer
preferences even if it is determined solely by a drive to maximize
advertising revenue. Second, the low cost of producing online
products and services attracts many producers who are
motivated primarily by their desire to reach a particular
audience, rather than primarily by a desire for advertising
revenue. Depending on how popular their offerings are, such
producers may attract some advertising but resist tailoring their
online offerings closely to advertiser preferences. In sum, while
contextual-advertising supported offerings may not reflect
consumer preferences as well as the offerings in a paid market
would, they may, in principle, do much better than the offerings
supported by broadcast advertising.
Online contextual
advertising, much like broadcast
advertising, is salient to consumers, and consumers can make
reasonable estimates of any disutility they expect from its
intrusion into their use of an associated online product or
service. In the online context, however, paid alternatives for
many online products and services have yet to emerge, so it may
be difficult for consumers to assess the extent to which the
advertising-supported model's susceptibility to advertiser
preferences distorts the offerings available to them. Possibly, the
relative dearth of paid alternatives reflects lower consumer
aversion to online advertising. Or perhaps consumers are
particularly susceptible to zero-price bias in the online
environment.9 7 If and when paid alternatives do emerge, one
would expect consumers to be able to make reasonably informed
estimates of the costs and benefits of paid and contextual
advertising-supported products and services, just as they are
able to do with broadcast content.9 8

9
See Kristina Shampanier, Nina Mazar, and Dan Ariely, Zero as a Special Price:
The True Value of Free Products, 26 Marketing Sci 742, 743 (2007) (finding
experimentally that consumers overreact to zero price in ways that are not explained by
transaction costs and discussing hypotheses as to why this may be the case).
98 An additional complication, however, is that many popular online products and
services involve significant network effects and entry barriers due to the importance of
accumulated data to the quality of the products. This effect is distinct from the effects of
data accumulated for behaviorally targeted advertising, which are discussed below, and
would affect competition for some types of online products and services even if only paid
business models were involved.
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C.

Online Behavioral Advertising and Advertiser Demand for
Data Extracting Apps

The behavioral advertising business model is based on two
technical features of the Internet: the possibility of placing
different ads in a given online context depending on the identity
of the user who is visiting the site and the ability to track
Internet users as they roam the online world. The assumption
behind this business model is that behaviorally targeted ads will
be more effective than contextual ads. 99 The behavioral
advertising business model incentivizes comprehensive data
collection because it is natural to assume that accumulating
more data will make for more effective ad personalization.
Moreover, because data storage is relatively cheap and research
on targeting algorithms is ongoing, the assumption that more
data is better need not be examined too carefully by advertising
intermediaries.
1.

The quest for effective behavioral advertising drives
data collection.

Behavioral advertising is more valuable to advertisers than
contextual advertising only if it motivates enough additional
purchases to cover its higher costs. In many situations, however,
behavioral targeting may have little impact on purchasing
propensity. Because of the diversity of contexts available on the
Internet and the fact that each Internet user visits those
contexts in proportion to her interests, contextual advertising
can, in the aggregate, provide reasonably well-tailored
advertising exposure. Moreover, search-based advertising, which
is far and away the dominant form of online advertising, is a
form of contextual advertising for present purposes because it
does not require substantial data collection. Search-based
advertising is particularly powerful because it relates to what
the consumer is looking for at the moment the ad is displayed.
(Recall the findings of Yan, et al, that targeting based on one
day's search queries was more effective than targeting based on
a week's search queries.)1 00

9 See, for example, Howard Beales, The Value of Behavioral Targeting at 11-13
(cited in note 16).
100 See text accompanying note 34.
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To outdo the aggregate effect of contextual advertising,
designers of behavioral advertising have to do one of four things:
1) combine information about an individual's online travels to
different sites in a synergistic way; 2) use information gleaned
from visits to specialized websites to target advertising to more
generic sites; 3) incorporate information gleaned from offline
behavior; or 4) incorporate information from visits to Internet
contexts that do not serve ads.
To be worthwhile, behavioral targeting has to increase
people's exposure to particular ads enough to have a significant
effect on their propensity to purchase. That may not be easy.
Companies whose likely customers tend to visit specialized
websites may not stand to gain much from behavioral targeting.
Consider, for example, a company that sells a device that doctors
use for treating a particular disease. The company currently
places contextual ads on websites frequented by doctors who
treat that particular disease. To deploy behavioral targeting, an
advertising intermediary would first establish that a particular
individual is a doctor who treats the disease in question by
observing her website trail. It would then serve the doctor ads
for the device when she visits non-specialized websites, such as
netflix.com, tripadvisor.com, or even webmd.com. This doctor
already sees the company's contextual ads, which are placed on
sites that we know she visits (because that is how the ad
intermediary figured out that she is a doctor who treats the
disease in question). She may not be in the mood to purchase a
medical
instrument
while
visiting
netflix.com
or
tripadvisor.com, so the ad on webmd is most likely to have some
positive impact. But is it likely to make her significantly more
willing to purchase the device?
Companies that produce truly mass market products, such
as AA batteries, may have essentially the opposite problem.
Since virtually everyone is a potential purchaser, an individual's
profile is of little use in assessing whether an ad would increase
purchase propensity. These companies may benefit most from
means for figuring out when, rather than whether, a given
individual is potentially interested in purchasing their products,
which leads us back to context (and especially to search).
Behavioral targeting thus is attractive to advertisers only
when they expect that a consumer's pattern of website visits will
reveal significantly more information about the propensity to
purchase a given product than visits to individual websites and
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online searches would reveal. Necessarily, these basic economic
facts drive behavioral advertising providers to seek the broadest
possible surveillance, both of consumers' behavior and of the
correlation of that behavior with purchases, as they seek to
demonstrate the existence of and uncover such patterns.
Given declining online advertising rates, the quest for
effective behavioral advertising thus drives increasingly
ubiquitous collection of data about consumers' online (and
offline) behavior. Given the relatively low cost of data storage,
there is the real possibility of a vicious cycle of data collection. If
advertising
is
under-performing
behaviorally
targeted
expectations, advertising intermediaries may be driven to collect
ever more data, on the theory that more data can be used,
perhaps in conjunction with improved algorithms, to make
targeting more effective. Moreover, because behavioral targeting
algorithms use statistical models to categorize Internet users
and predict their responses to advertising, companies are
incentivized to collect data about as many individuals as
possible, including those who never respond to a single ad, so
that advertisers can avoid wasting money targeting ads to those
individuals.10 1
2.

Behavioral advertising and consumer preferences.

Because behavioral targeting is usually combined with
contextual elements, behavioral advertising, like contextual
advertising, may support a range of specialized online products
and services. However, the behavioral advertising model drives
an important wedge between advertiser and consumer
preferences for online products and services. Advertiser demand
for user data will skew the design of online products and
services toward data extraction. In addition, while contextual
advertising intermediaries are matchmakers for advertisers and
websites, and have little interest in influencing the
characteristics of online goods and services, behavioral targeting
intermediaries have incentives to produce (or acquire) consumer
products and services tailored to extracting as much data from
as many identified users as possible. Moreover, they may be
expected to focus on collecting information that cannot be

101 See Turow, The Daily You at 88-110 (cited in note 8) (providing a discussion of
the drive to identify particular consumers as "Waste").
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gleaned from user visits to ad-supported websites, since
collecting such information is an important way to make
contextual
more effective than
advertising
behavioral
advertising.
The business models of the companies that dominate the
Internet are consistent with this analysis. For example, David
Evans collected data in 2009 about the top twenty online
services (in terms of page views) and the information products
they provided to consumers. 102 Five of the top six (and nine in
all) provided platform services such as search, email, and social
networking.103 Platform services such as these have the features
one would expect (in hindsight at this point, of course) in a
behavioral advertising business model. They are attractive to a
wide range of consumers (and often have network effects for
consumers), are designed to draw out personal information from
consumers in various ways, and do not require that the platform
provider make large investments in creating content.
As with other free advertising-supported business models,
consumer preferences are reflected only indirectly in the
behavioral advertising business model by consumers' decisions
to use particular online products and services. Some of the
tradeoffs imposed on consumers by the model are the same as
those they face in dealing with the contextual and broadcast
advertising business models. Consumers must weigh the
benefits of access to the product or service against the costs
imposed by viewing advertising. To the extent that behavioral
advertising is more useful to consumers than contextual
advertising (rather than just more persuasive), consumers
presumably will be more likely to find the tradeoff worthwhile.
What makes behavioral advertising worse from a consumer
perspective is that, as acknowledged by the privacy as price
analogy, data collection imposes additional costs on consumers,
due both to direct harms due to data collection and to distortions
of the market's provision of goods and services away from
consumer preferences and toward data extraction. If, as argued
in the next Part, consumers cannot reasonably estimate those
Evans, 23 J Econ Persp at 45 (cited in note 6). Two others (eBay.com and
Amazon.com) were online retail aggregators. Most of the others were major producers of
broadcast content (seven out of twenty). See id.
10 Id at Table 2. The other seven provided more traditional entertainment content
(and included mostly media giants, such as Comcast, Viacom, Time Warner, Disney, and
ESPN). Id.
1os
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potential costs, their use of online products and services will not
accurately signal their preferences. In addition, as argued below,
the interconnected nature of personal information puts up
barriers to the entry of paid business models through which
consumers could signal nuanced preferences for particular
online products and services.
D.

Summary of Advertising-Based Business Models

We can now summarize the comparison of advertisingsupported business models. The broadcast advertising business
model responded to failures in the market for broadcast content
and transaction costs in matching consumers to advertising.
Broadcasters respond directly to advertiser demand by
producing content tailored to attracting large numbers of
consumers and exposing them to broadcast advertising. The
broadcast advertising model thus biases content production
toward average, rather than specialized, interests and toward
content designed to appeal to those who will (or can be
persuaded to) purchase mainstream products. Consumer
preferences are reflected imperfectly, as evidenced by the fact
that, as technology has changed, consumers have turned to
other sources of entertainment content, including paid business
models. Consumers are reasonably capable of estimating the
direct disutility imposed by unwanted broadcast advertising
and, now that paid alternatives are technically feasible, of
assessing the disutility imposed by the distortion of broadcast
content to meet advertiser preferences. The market for
broadcast content appears to be able to support a mixture of
paid and advertising-supported business models in response to
diverse consumer preferences.
The online contextual advertising business model developed
in response to the explosion of online "channels" for content,
products, and services. Automated methods match ads for a
more diverse range of products to the diverse and changing
contexts available online. Contextual advertising-supported
offerings thus can reach farther into the "long tail" of specialized
consumer preferences than broadcast advertising-supported
offerings. The array of ad-supported offerings remains somewhat
distorted away from consumer preferences by advertisers'
preferences for contexts that are good proxies for consumer
purchasing behavior. Consumers are capable of estimating the
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direct disutility imposed by advertising and of assessing the
tradeoffs between paid and contextual advertising-based
business models. Paid alternatives have not emerged online to
the extent they have in the broadcast arena. As discussed below,
the data collection associated with behavioral advertising erects
barriers to entry to paid business models online. If those
barriers could be eliminated, there appears to be no reason that
paid and contextual advertising business could not co-exist in
the online market.
The behavioral advertising business model has much in
common with the contextual advertising model, but there is a
critical difference. To improve on contextual advertising,
behavioral advertising intermediaries will focus on extracting as
much data from as many individuals as possible, skewing the
design of online products and services toward data extractors.
Consumers are not well-equipped to take the costs of data
collection into account, however, as the next Part explains. As a
result, demand for contextual advertising and paid business
models is likely to be artificially low.
III. THE MYTH OF PAYING FOR APPS WITH DATA
Internet users' interactions with the behavioral advertising
model are not analogous to purchase decisions in which they
rationally estimate the expected costs of data collection as
compared to the benefits of online products and services. First,
Internet users face essentially insurmountable information
deficits and bounded rationality issues related to online data
collection. This point is certainly not news, having been
emphasized by commentators and privacy advocates both
recently and early in the Internet era. 104 Yet the particular

10
See, for example, Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The
Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 Wash L Rev 1033, 1072-74 (1999)
(discussing the problems consumers face in assessing the costs of data collection). See
generally Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Paradox,126 Harv
L Rev *1 (2013), online at http: //papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstractid=2171018&
download=yes (visited Sept 15, 2013) (summarizing many of the issues consumers face in
assessing privacy risks and the difficulties with the privacy self-management paradigm);
James P. Nehf, Open Book: The Failed Promise of Information Privacy in America 191
(CreateSpace 2012) (discussing reasons for failure of the self-policing model for privacy);
James P. Nehf, Shopping for Privacy Online: Consumer Decision Making Strategies and
the Emerging Market for Information Privacy, 2005 U Ill J L Tech & Pol 1, 6; Richard
Warner, Undermined Norms: The Corrosive Effect of Information Processing Technology
on Informational Privacy, 55 St Louis L J 1047, 1084-86 (2011) (raising questions about
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consequence emphasized here, which is that Internet users
cannot make reasonable estimates of their expected disutility
from online data collection and thus cannot participate
effectively in a market for products and services supported by
behaviorally targeted advertising, has received less attention.
Most importantly, the debate has virtually ignored the fact that
it is nearly impossible for a consumer to estimate the increment
in expected harm associated with a given instance of data
collection. Perhaps that is because the issue has been framed for
the most part in terms of "privacy protection" rather than
"market failure."1 05
Second, unlike the payment of money in an ordinary retail
transaction or the disutility imposed by broadcast or contextual
advertising, data collection does not occur at a "point of
purchase." In fact, there is no salient exchange transaction.
Rather, Internet users are subjected to ongoing and silent data
collection in connection with their ongoing use of online products
and services. The hidden aspect of data collection triggers
additional concerns.
A.

Consumers Cannot Make Meaningful Estimates of Expected
Disutility from Particular Instances of Data Collection

Consumers' ability to assess the expected costs of a
purportedly free online service is undermined by imperfect
information in a way that is quite unfamiliar from other market
transactions over products and services. In the ordinary case,
consumers may be concerned that they do not have the
information that they need to assess the value of the things they
are purchasing, especially if the goods on sale are so-called
"experience goods," (such as, for example, theater performances
or restaurant meals) the qualities of which consumers can
assess only after purchase, or "credence goods," such as medical
or legal services, the qualities of which consumers have
difficulty assessing even after purchase. 0 6
the viability of using consent to limit mass surveillance); Tal Zarsky, Mine Your Own
Business, 5 Yale J L & Tech 1, 33 (2002-2003).
'0 For an exception, see generally Jan Whittington and Chris J. Hoofnagle, Social
Networks and the Law: Unpacking Privacy's Price, 90 NC L Rev 1327 (2012) (analyzing
consumer interactions with a social networking site from the perspective of transaction
cost economics).
106 See, for example, Darby and Karni, 16 J L & Econ at 68-72 (cited in note 2);
Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 44 J Econ Lit at 5-6 (cited in note 2).
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In ordinary sales transactions, however, consumers have
very good (though perhaps not perfect) information about how
much disutility they will incur by turning over their "payment."
When they pay with money, consumers can rely on extensive
market experience to estimate the disutility they will incur
when they hand over a particular sum. In ordinary barter
transactions, consumers are trading away items that they own
and, therefore, can assess fairly accurately what they will lose
parting with them. As already noted, much the same is true in
the context of broadcast or contextual advertising. Consumers
have the information and experience that they need to
determine whether to subject themselves to advertising in
exchange for broadcast content or an online product or service.
In the behavioral advertising context, everything is
different. Significantly, while a consumer who barters away the
harvest of her vegetable garden to a neighbor must estimate the
expected value of the uses she herself might make of the
vegetables in order to decide whether to make the trade, she
knows what vegetables she has traded away and does not much
care what the neighbor does with them. The information needed
to assess the expected disutility from a "payment" in data is of a
different order. An Internet user's potential disutility from data
collection is almost entirely due to future uses or misuses of the
data to which the actions of the data recipient, in combination
with the actions of unknown others, might expose the user.
Internet users do not know, and often cannot know, the
likelihood or magnitude of various potential disutilities that
might result from a particular stream of data collection. They do
not know, and generally cannot know, sufficient detail about
what data is collected by the companies with which they
interact, how it will be secured, and what uses eventually will be
made of it. If user data is a "payment" for online services, one
might call it a "credence payment," since users cannot determine
the price they are paying either before or after they have paid it.
Internet users lack reasonable access to at least three kinds
of information they would need in order to make reasonable
estimates of the expected disutility of online data collection.10 7

For similar discussions of the information problems confronting consumers
seeking to assess the potential harm of data collection, see Solove, 126 Harv L Rev at *13
(cited in note 104); Nehf, Open Book at 186-256 (cited in note 104); Nehf, 2005 U Ill J L
Tech and Pol at 23-27 (cited in note 104).
107
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First, users lack information about the types of harms that may
arise from data collection, the prevalence of those harms, and
their costs. Second, users lack detailed and useful information
about company practices involving data collection, storage, and
use. Third, users lack information about how any given instance
of data collection fits into the data about them that is already
flowing in the online ecosystem. Without these three types of
information,
Internet
users
cannot
make
meaningful
assessments of the marginal expected disutility of any given use
of an online product or service. Even if they had the necessary
information, bounded capacity for information processing and
bounded rationality would interfere with their ability to assess
their expected disutility and compare it to the expected utility of
a given online product or service.
1.

Imperfect information about potential sources of
disutility.

The potential disutility of online data collection by
businesses arises from numerous
advertising-supported
sources,10 8 including the risk of identity theft and other potential
harms from accidental data breaches and the activities of blackhat hackers; 109 the risk of adverse effects from data access by
employers, insurers, government agencies, law enforcement, and
others; disutility associated with the "creepiness" of data
surveillance and resulting chilling effects or other impositions
on autonomy; and harms imposed by unscrupulous insiders
(such as stalkers or con artists) who make nefarious use of their
legitimate access to the data. Nearly all of these potential costs
of data collection are probabilistic and, with the exception of
identity fraud, there is little statistical information available
about the prevalence or severity of these harms. Even for
identity fraud, readily available statistical information gives a
general idea of its average costs ($18 billion or $60 per person
per year in the US) and prevalence (about 5 percent of
Americans annually) but no way to determine how these

1os See, for example, Nehf, Open Book at 7-29, 159-70 (cited in note 104); Solove,
126 Harv L Rev at *13 (cited in note 104).
109 See Techopedia, Black Hat Hacker (Janalta Interactive 2013), online at
http: //www.techopedia.com/definition/26342/black-hat-hacker (visited Sept 15, 2013) ("A
black hat hacker is a person who attempts to find computer security vulnerabilities and
exploit them for personal financial gain or other malicious reasons.")
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statistics relate to particular collection practices on the part of
particular companies.no Available information thus is limited
and not particularly well suited to the task of estimating
expected disutility of particular online activities.
Moreover, the costs of mass surveillance are not merely
individual but also social.11 1 Individuals' decisions about data
collection thus have implications for other members of society.
In particular, mass surveillance of online behavior may have
particularly important ramifications for members of disfavored
social or political groups. 1 1 2
a) Price discriminationas a source of consumer disutility
from data collection. One emerging concern, which is worth
discussing in some detail, is that data accumulated for
behavioral targeting of advertisements can be (and is) used not
only to target ads for particular products to particular
consumers but also to facilitate price discrimination, by quoting
different prices to different consumers and by offering discounts
and special deals to some consumers and not to others. 113
no See Javelin Strategy and Research, 2012 Identity Fraud Report: Consumers
Taking Control to Reduce their Risk of Fraud *6 (Javelin Strategy & Research Feb 2012),
online at https://www.javelinstrategy.com/brochure/240 (visited Sept 15, 2013); Lynn
Langton and Michael Planty, Victims of Identity Theft, 2008, National Crime
Victimization Survey Supplement, Bureau of Justice Statistics *3 (DOJ Dec 2010), online
at http:/fbjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vitO8.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013); Lynn Langton, Identity
Theft Reported by Households, 2005-2010, Bureau of Justice Statistics *1-5 (DOJ Nov
2011), online at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/itrh0510.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
n' See Solove, 126 Harv L Rev at *1 (cited in note 104) (collecting sources).
112 See generally Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association: PoliticalProfiling,
Surveillance and the Privacyof Groups, 46 Ariz L Rev 621 (2004) (considering the impact
of surveillance on disfavored political and religious groups); Michael Kosinski, et al,
Private Traits and Attributes are Predictablefrom Digital Records of Human Behavior,
PNAS 2013 (Mar 11, 2013), online at http: /www.pnas.org/contentlearly/2013/03/
06/1218772110 (visited Sept 15, 2013) (describing empirical study of the extent to which
traits such as sexual orientation and political party are predictable from Facebook
information).
13 See, for example, Dana Mattioli, On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered to Pricier Hotels
(Wall St J June 26, 2012), online at http://on.wsj.com/LwTnPH (visited Sept 15, 2013);
Jennifer Valentino-Devries, et al, Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users (Wall St J,
Dec 23, 2012), online at http:Ion.wsj.comiTjlW2V (visited Sept 15, 2013); Stephanie

Clifford, Web Coupons Know Lots About You, and They Tell, NY Times (NY Times Apr
16, 2010), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/17/business/media/17coupon
.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0 (visited Sept 15, 2013). For extensive critical discussions of
online price discrimination, see Turow, The Daily You at 143-46 (cited in note 8);
Nathan Newman, The Cost of Lost Privacy: Consumer Harm and Rising Economic
Inequality in the Age of Google, online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2310146 (visited
October 10, 2013). See also Andrew M. Odlyzko, Privacy, economics, and price

discrimination on the Internet, in N. Sadeh, ed, ICEC2003: Fifth International
Conference on Electronic Commerce 355-66 (ACM 2003) (arguing that the online
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Indeed, the potential to enhance profits through price
discrimination may be far greater than the potential to do so
through targeted advertising per se.114
The economics of price discrimination are complex.1 15 In the
textbook case, known as "first-degree price discrimination," a
monopolist producer is assumed to have perfect knowledge of
consumer willingness to pay and to be able to charge each
consumer a price equal to her maximum willingness to pay.116 In
this stylized situation, price discrimination increases total social
welfare in cases involving significant fixed costs."' The picture
is less rosy from a consumer perspective, however, since the
producer extracts the entire surplus from each transaction,
price
surplus.1 18
First degree
leaving
no
consumer
discrimination has not been an issue of much practical
importance because it depends on the producer having perfect
knowledge of each consumer's willingness to pay and being able,
as a monopolist, to extract the maximum price." 9
environment will incentivize and facilitate price discrimination at the expense of
privacy).
114
See Odlzyko, Privacy, economics, and price discrimination on the Internet at 2
(cited in note 113).
u1 For overviews of the economics of price discrimination, see Hal R. Varian,
Differential Pricing and Efficiency, First Monday 1 (August 5, 1996), online at
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/rt/printerFriendly/473/394
(visited Sept 15,
2013); L.A. Stole, Price Discriminationand Competition, in M. Armstrong and R. Porter,
eds, Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 3, 2221-99 (North-Holland 2007),
online at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edullars.stole/papers/pdce.pdf (visited Sept 15,
2013); M. Armstrong, Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination, in
R. Blundell, W. Newey, and T. Persson, eds, Advances in Economics and Econometrics:
Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Volume 2,
97-141 (Cambridge 2006), online at http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/14558/1/14558.pdf (visited
Sept 15, 2013); Kathleen Carroll and Dennis Coates, Teaching Price Discrimination:
Some Clarification, 66 S Econ J 466 (1999); Akiva Miller, What Do We Worry About
When We Worry About Price Discrimination? Ethical Considerations in the Use of
PersonalInformation in Pricing(working paper on file with author).
116 See Armstrong, Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discriminationat
3 (cited in note 115). See also Carroll and Coates, 66 Southern Econ J at 470 (cited in
note 115) (critiquing the failure of economics textbooks to distinguish between pure
monopolistic price discrimination and other versions).
n1 See Varian, Differential Pricingand Efficiency at 2-3 (cited in note 115); Carroll
and Coates, 66 S Econ J at 472-76; Armstrong, Recent Developments in the Economics of
Price Discriminationat 36-38 (cited in note 115).
ns See Armstrong, Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discriminationat
7 (cited in note 115) ("[Tlhe benefits of allowing first-degree price discrimination depend
on the chosen welfare standard: with a total welfare standard such discrimination is
beneficial whereas with a consumer standard it is not.").
n1 Id at 3 ("In its purest form, the information needed for first-degree price
discrimination makes it more of a theoretical benchmark than a realistic business
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Because, at least until recently, producers have not had
detailed information about individual consumers' willingness to
pay, they have deployed other pricing strategies, often based on
product versioning or group pricing, to align price roughly with
willingness to pay. 120 In one approach to what is termed "seconddegree price discrimination," for example, a company offers a
menu of differently priced variations of a basic good, inducing
consumers to sort themselves according to willingness to pay. 12 1
"Third-degree price discrimination," on the other hand, uses
identifiable consumer characteristics as a rough proxy for
willingness to pay. 122 For example, movie theaters often offer
different prices for exactly the same theater experience to
adults, senior citizens, students, and children. Economic
predictions of the welfare and distributive impacts of these
forms of price discrimination depend on specifics. 123 For
example, efforts to create sufficiently differentiated product
versions to support second degree price discrimination can lead
producers to offer inefficiently low quality goods to consumers
with low willingness to pay. 124
Competition, which must be imperfect to make price
discrimination feasible, 12 5 generally reduces the extent to which
producers can match price to maximum consumer willingness to
pay and hence limits their ability to drain consumer surplus. 126

strategy.").
120 See Varian, Differential Pricingand Efficiency at 5-7 (cited
in note 115); Carroll
and Coates, 66 S Econ J at 468-70 (cited in note 115); Armstrong, Recent Developments
in the Economics of PriceDiscriminationat 2-5, 8 (cited in note 115).
121See Varian, Differential Pricingand Efficiency at 5 (cited in note 115); Carroll
and Coates, 66 S Econ J at 469 (cited in note 115). Note that there are a variety of
possible second-degree price discrimination strategies. Their common feature is that the
offerings are structured to induce consumers to reveal their willingness to pay by
choosing among differently priced options.
122 Carroll and Coates 66 S Econ J at 469-70 (cited in note 115); Varian, Differential
Pricingand Efficiency at 4 (cited in note 115).
123 Armstrong, Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discriminationat 1011 (cited in note 115); Carroll and Coates, 66 Southern Econ J at 472-73 (cited in note
115).
124Varian, DifferentialPricing and Efficiency at 5-6 (cited in note 115).
125 Carroll and Coates, 66 S Econ J at 470-71 (cited in note 115) (noting that price
discriminating firm must have some degree of market power and cannot be a price
taker). In a perfectly competitive market with full information, price would equal
marginal cost. Carroll and Coates identify three basic prerequisites for price
discrimination: 1) some degree of market power; 2) means to prevent arbitrage; and 3)
differences between consumers' price elasticities of demand. Id.
126 Armstrong, Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination
at 8
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It
also
introduces
an
additional
motive
for price
discrimination-business stealing. Companies' efforts to tempt
one another's customers by offering them lower prices can
reduce prices overall to the benefit of consumers. 127 Economic
predictions of the net impact of these competing effects on
welfare and distribution of surplus also depend on specifics. 128
Despite the complexities of the economic models, one can
Price
applicable
statements.
some
generally
make
discrimination can increase total welfare only if it results in
increased output or, equivalently, if more purchases are made
than would be made in a single price market with a similar
competitive structure. 129 This is possible only if prices are
brought closer to marginal cost for at least some consumers,
motivating additional purchases by those with relatively low
willingness to pay.
The fact that, in some cases, price discrimination can make
goods accessible to additional consumers is probably its most
influential normative justification. 13 0 Note, however, that price
discrimination does not always expand output and, equally
importantly, that it improves access for consumers only in
conditions of monopoly or imperfect competition-in other words
when there is market failure.131 A competitive market with a
single price equal to marginal cost, if it can be achieved, is better
for consumers than even the most consumer-friendly price
discrimination strategy.
Two types of market failure are of particular interest here.
Price discrimination is often associated with goods for which
average fixed costs of production are high relative to marginal

(cited in note 115).
127
Rosa Branca Esteves, A Survey on the Economics of Behavior-Based Price
Discrimination4 (NIPE May 2009), online at http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/
docs/2009[NIPE_WP_5_2009.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013). See also Armstrong, Recent
Developments in the Economics of Price Discriminationat 14-18, 28 (cited in note 115).
128
Esteves, A Survey on the Economics of Behavior-Based Price Discrimination at 4
(cited in note 127); Miller, What Do We Worry About When We Worry About Price
Discrimination?at 13 (cited in note 115).
129
Carroll and Coates, 66 Southern Econ J at 472-73 (cited in note 115); Varian,
Differential Pricing and Efficiency at 6 (cited in note 115); Armstrong, Recent
Developments in the Economics of Price Discriminationat 10 (cited in note 115).
13o See Varian, Differential Pricingand Efficiency at 7 (cited in note 115).
131 Carroll and Coates, 66 Southern Econ J 466 (cited in note 115);
Armstrong,
Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination (cited in note 115);
Varian, DifferentialPricingand Efficiency (cited in note 115).
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costs. 132 Perfectly competitive markets fail to produce such
goods, since marginal cost pricing leaves producers unable to
break even.133 Prices may fail to converge to marginal costs even
for goods with low fixed costs, however. Perhaps the most
important reason for this type of market failure is the fact that
it is costly for consumers to collect the information needed for
price and quality comparison. 134 Transportation costs of
obtaining goods from different sellers similarly segment the
market, depressing competition. 13 5 While the fixed cost issue is
intrinsic to some goods, these other causes of market failure may
be addressable directly. Normative assessments therefore
should consider any potential interactions between price
discrimination strategies and strategies for mitigating these
other causes of market failure.
An assessment of potential consumer disutility from online
price discrimination should not stop with the economic analysis.
Public debates about price discrimination also reflect concerns
about fairness and distribution. 13 6 Consumers have had strong
negative reactions to price discrimination practices that
appeared to use individual information about willingness to pay
as a basis for charging higher prices. 137 Some group-based
proxies for willingness to pay are widely accepted, while others
are not. Thus, age-based and convenience-based proxies for
willingness to pay appear to be widely accepted, while proxies
based on race or ethnicity certainly would be deemed
unacceptable, even if those categories were correlated with
willingness to pay. Similarly, some ways of varying quality
among versions of a product are considered unfair and immoral.
Varian, Differential Pricingand Efficiency at 7-8 (cited in note 115).
Id at 2-3. This problem is equivalent to the standard justification for intellectual
property rights. See, for example, Michael Meurer, Copyright Law and Price
Discrimination,23 Cardozo L Rev 55 (2001).
'34 S. Salop and J.E. Stiglitz, The Theory of Sales: A Simple Model of Equilibrium
Price Dispersion with Identical Agents, 72 Am Econ Rev (Dec 1982). See also Newman,
The Cost of Lost Privacy at 78-81 (cited in note 113) (discussing these issues in the
context of online behavioral advertising).
13
See, for example, Esteves, A Survey on the Economics of Behavior-Based Price
Discriminationat n 5 (cited in note 127); Stole, Price Discriminationand Competition at
31-32 (cited in note 115).
116 See Miller,
What Do We Worry About When We Worry About Price
Discrimination?(cited in note 115).
137 See, for example, Odlyzko, Privacy, economics, and price discrimination on the
Internet at 5 (cited in note 113); Valentino-Devries, et al, Websites Vary Prices, Deals
Based on Users, Wall St J (cited in note 113).
1,2
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Thus, for example, US society has not deemed it acceptable for
in the
price
discrimination
to effectuate
companies
pharmaceutical context by producing less effective or more risky
"versions" of drugs for sale to those with lesser ability to pay.
Price discrimination practices that users believe to be unfair are
sources of disutility for those users.
Price discrimination strategies also may impose costs on
consumers if they are designed to exploit systematic behavioral
irrationalities,
information
asymmetries,
and consumer
transaction costs so that consumers do not fully comprehend
either the features of the goods they buy or the payment terms
to which they agree. 138 Unlike true price discrimination, which
aims to align prices with consumer willingness to pay (and
hence with consumer preferences), exploitative pricing
strategies are aimed at extracting payments reflecting
consumers' ability to pay. Because of the complex structures,
such as loyalty programs, subscriptions, and discount coupons,
that often are used to implement second and third degree price
discrimination, it may be difficult for consumers (or regulators,
for that matter) to distinguish true price discrimination schemes
from such exploitative tactics.
In light of the complex issues associated with price
discrimination, how should we assess the potential disutility
imposed by the behavioral advertising business model, with its
associated ubiquitous collection, aggregation and analysis of
personal data? As a preliminary matter, it is certainly clear that
the ordinary consumer has little hope of sorting through the
economics to assess her expected costs and benefits from the
price discrimination facilitated by online data collection. But
that is the case for price discrimination generally. The real
question of interest here is the particular impact of online
targeting and data collection on expected costs and benefits.
Online targeting and data collection affect price
discrimination in at least three ways. First, online data
collection facilitates more finely grained mapping of consumer
willingness to pay. In some cases (and probably increasingly),
this may mean that producers have individualized information

138
See Zarsky, 5 Yale J L & Tech at 30-31 (cited in note 104). For a discussion of
behavioral economics issues with complex contractual pricing schemes, see Oren BarGill, Seduction By Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets
(Oxford 2012).
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about consumer willingness to pay for particular goods. For
example, if a consumer makes frequent trips on a favorite
airline, that airline may be able to gauge quite accurately the
price point (or price differential) at which the consumer gives up
and books a trip on a different airline that is offering a cheaper
fare.139 Perhaps more commonly, online data collection results in
more well-researched and fine-grained proxies for willingness to
pay.140

All else equal, a more fine-grained mapping of consumer
willingness to pay allows producers to move in the direction of
first degree price discrimination, with results for total welfare
and consumer surplus that are dependent on the interplay
between better ability to extract consumer surplus and better
targeted business stealing efforts. The effect of more finegrained tailoring on prices paid by any given consumer is even
more difficult to predict, though one might anticipate that
output expansion will be particularly beneficial to lower income
consumers while business stealing efforts are more likely to
target more "valuable" higher income consumers.141 The direct
effect of more fine-grained targeting on consumer perceptions of
fairness is likely to be negative, especially if consumers learn
that pricing varies in ways that raise distributive concerns.142
Second, online data collection can be used for market
research to hone practices intended to obfuscate true price and
exploit consumer irrationality and lack of information. While the
direct effects of ubiquitous online data collection may be positive
or negative for a particular consumer, the use of data collected
online to fine tune practices such as these is a clear source of
disutility to consumers. Without knowing the extent of such

'39 See, for example, Frequent Fliers,Prepare to Pay More (NY Times Mar 4, 2013),
online at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/04/opinion/frequent-fliers-prepare-to-paymore.html?_r-0 (discussing recent regulatory changes that will permit airlines to offer
different prices and deals to different customers).
140 Natasha Singer, You for Sale: Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome, NY
Times, (NY Times June 16, 2012), online athttp://nyti.ms/LcBw0g (visited Sept 15, 2013)
(detailing how Axciom "assigns consumers to one of 70 detailed socioeconomic clusters
and markets to them accordingly ... [with sellers making] customized appeals any time,
anywhere.").
141See Turow, The Daily You (cited in note 8) (discussing the division of consumers
into "targets" and "waste").
142 See, for example, Valentino-Devries, et al, Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on
Users (cited in note 113) (reporting that location-based pricing by Staples resulted in
higher prices being charged to lower income consumers).
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efforts and the degree to which they are made more effective as
a result of online data collection, consumers cannot estimate the
magnitude of this disability.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the trend toward
online targeting and data collection may undermine the online
environment's potential to enhance consumer welfare by
mitigating some of the factors that undermine the competitive
market. As discussed above, even when price discrimination
enhances consumer welfare, it is a second-best strategy
premised on the assumption that a competitive market is not
attainable. Unless there are high fixed costs for producing a
product, consumers will benefit if competitive conditions are
improved. While price discrimination may remove some of the
sting of imperfect competition under some conditions, the online
environment has the potential to enhance competition directly.
The Internet decreases consumer information costs, thereby
facilitating product evaluation, search, and price comparison
between sellers. In some markets, it also can facilitate
competition by reducing the costs of serving large geographical
areas and thus bringing more sellers into the mix.
Companies' efforts to price discriminate are directly at odds
with the possibility for improved competition online because
price discrimination is possible only when producers can
price
which
pricing.
Arbitrage,
differential
maintain
discrimination strategies must be designed to preclude, is, by
the same token, a mechanism for enhancing competition. The
online environment can decrease the transaction costs
associated with arbitrage drastically, as eBay.com and
Craigslist.com illustrate, but producer strategies to prevent
arbitrage undermine that potential. Similarly, the siloed and
complicated pricing schemes associated with individually
targeted price discrimination undermine the Internet's potential
to reduce the costs of price and product. comparison. The
disutility stemming from lost
potential for consumer
opportunities to reduce impediments to competition as the
online environment is tailored more and more for behavioral
tracking and price discrimination may well be quite large.
In sum, the price discrimination facilitated by the online
behavioral advertising business model may impose costs on
consumers in several different ways, from direct effects to lost
opportunities for a more competitive market.
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Imperfect information about company data practices.

Studies continue to demonstrate that Internet users lack
basic knowledge about data collection online. For example, a
recent consumer survey by Chris Hoofnagle and Jennifer Urban
suggested that a majority of respondents either held false beliefs
about basic aspects of data use by "free" websites or were
uninformed.143 Nineteen percent of those surveyed thought that
"[flree websites that are supported by advertising are [not]
allowed to sell information gathered from users of the site, even
if they have a privacy policy," while 40 percent did not know
whether the statement was true or false. 144 Twenty-five percent
believed that "when visiting free websites supported by
advertising, you have the right to require the website to delete
the information it has about you," while 42 percent did not know
whether the statement was true or false.145
One might be tempted to conclude that this lack of
information reflects indifference, were it not for the fact that
detailed information about company practices that users might
actually find helpful in assessing the expected disutility of a
company's data collection is largely unavailable. Because
company data collection, storage, and use practices are not
directly observable by consumers, the information available to
Internet users about commercial online data collection is found
in privacy policies. Privacy regulation in the United States has
been based roughly on the so-called Fair Information Principles,
or "FIPs," which provide the conceptual basis for sectoral privacy
statutes 146 and for the Federal Trade Commission's approach to
privacy under its "unfair and deceptive practices" jurisdiction. 147
There are various versions of FIPs available. For example, the
143 Chris J. Hoofnagle, Jennifer Urban, and Su Li, Privacy and Modern Advertising:
Most US Internet Users Want 'Do Not Track' to Stop Collection of Data about their Online
Activities *10-13 (Amsterdam
Privacy Conference Oct 8, 2012), online at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2152135 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
114 Id at *20.
145 Id.
146 See, for example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, codified
at 15 USC § 1681 et seq;
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-191,
110 Stat 1936 (1996), codified at 29 USC 1181 et seq; Video Privacy Protection Act,
codified at 18 USC § 2710 et seq.
"' 15 USC § 45. See also FTC, Fair Information Practice Principles, online at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm (visited Sept 15, 2013) (describing how
the fair information principles relate to "safeguards required to assure that [information
practices] are fair and provide adequate privacy protection").
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Federal Trade Commission, which is the primary regulator of
commercial
data
collection
online,
states
them
as
Notice/Awareness,
Choice/Consent,
Access/Participation,
Integrity/Security, and Enforcement/Redress. 14 8 United States
law and regulation have (at least thus far) emphasized the
notice and choice principles, 149 with the result that, in the
commercial data collection arena, the primary mechanism for
implementing the FIPs has been to have consumers agree to a
business's privacy policy. Privacy policies are notoriously
ineffective at providing information to consumers about online
businesses' data practices.15 0 They are generally long and often
are written in legalese. Even privacy policies that avoid legalese
usually provide only long laundry lists of broad types of
information about an individual that a business may collect and
types of uses to which it will be put.1'1 Indeed, privacy policies
often disclose the fact that consumer information collected by
one online entity is shared with other entities, without providing
specifics about to whom disclosure is made, from whom
information is obtained, and for what purposes information from
different sources is combined. 152
One area in which consumers' lack of information about
company data practices may be particularly significant is price
discrimination. The second and third degree price discrimination
practices with which consumers are familiar necessitate a fairly
148 See
FTC, Fair Information Practice Principles n 29, online
at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports /privacy3/endnotes.shtm#N 29 (visited Sept 15, 2013). The
FTC issued a new Framework for privacy regulation in March 2012, which attempts to
expand on the FIPs in light of current technology. However, this framework has yet to
have much impact on statutory privacy regulation or on industry practices.
149 This notice-and-choice framework has been the subject of considerable criticism,
but nonetheless remains at the foundation of current regulation and practice. See, for
example, Hoofnagle, et al, Privacy and Modern Advertising: Most US Internet Users
Want 'Do Not Track'to Stop Collectionof Data about their Online Activities at *2 (cited in
note 143); Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, Consumer
Protection in the Age of the Information Economy (2006), online at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1156972 (visited Sept 15, 2013); James P. Nehf, The
FTC's Proposed Framework for Privacy Protection Online: A Move Toward Substantive
Controls or Just More Notice and Choice?, 31 Wm Mitchell L Rev 1727 (2011).
"so See Tene and Polonetsky, 13 Minn J L Sci & Tech at 313 (cited in note 1); Solove,
126 Harv L Rev at *4-6 (cited in note 104).
15'
See, for example, Facebook, Information We Receive About You, online at
http://www.facebook.comlabout/privacy/your-info (visited Sept 15, 2013); Google, Privacy
Policy (July 27, 2012), online at http:I/www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy (visited
Sept 15, 2013).
152
See Facebook, Information We Receive About You (cited in note 151); Google,
Privacy Policy (cited in note 151).
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high degree of transparency. To select among product versions,
consumers must compare their prices and properties. To obtain
senior discounts or student fares, consumers generally must
take affirmative action to announce or register their status and
are aware of the price benefits they can obtain by doing so.
When a price discrimination structure is transparent,
consumers are able to express their preferences about, and
potentially to influence, its parameters.
Online behaviorally based price discrimination can be much
more secretive, leaving consumers in the dark about why they
are being offered particular prices and how those prices compare
to prices being offered to others.1 53 Consumers may not even be
aware that price discrimination is occurring. Though the online
context may assist consumers in comparing prices offered to
them by different producers, it tends to obfuscate pricing
differentials between consumers. When shopping online,
consumers view prices privately and may find it difficult or
impossible to find out what prices are being offered to others.
The online context also facilitates the use of targeted coupons,
sales, and special offers, which complicate price comparison.
Moreover, even if consumers were somehow to gather
information about the different deals being offered to different
individuals, they might not be able to "reverse engineer" that
information to find out how pricing was determined.
The lack of transparency in behaviorally targeted price
discrimination ensures that its costs cannot be assessed and
weighed by consumers. It thus prevents consumers from
expressing their preferences with respect to these practices
when making decisions about online activity.
In sum, many of the things that consumers would need to
know in order to make accurate assessments of the potential
costs of data collection are not disclosed by online businesses.
Specific information about what data is held, in what format,
and with what security precautions, specific knowledge about
how the data is used to target advertising or to price
discriminate, and specific knowledge of who has access to the
information is held close to the vest. Companies may have very
good competitive or security reasons for keeping some of these
153 Armstrong, Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination
at 5
(cited in note 115); Odlyzko, Privacy, economics, and price discrimination on the Internet
at 4 (cited in note 113).
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things secret, but nonetheless the secrets get in the way of
consumers' ability to predict what is likely to happen to their
data and, as a result, to them. Moreover, even where
information is available either about a company's data practices
or about steps the consumer might take to mitigate the potential
harms of data collection, consumers face extremely high
transaction costs associated with obtaining, reading, and
understanding available information, given the length and
complexity of privacy policies.154
Even if a consumer knew everything there was to know
about what an online company was doing and planned to do
with consumer data at the time of a particular data disclosure, it
would still be impossible for her to predict what would happen
with the data in the future, since companies routinely change
their collection and data use practices as time goes on,
governments change their laws and practices pertaining to
obtaining access to and using data held by private companies,
technological innovation affects data security and the possible
uses of data for better and for worse, and so forth. This fact
explains, in part, why companies choose to keep their privacy
policies as vague as possible. Thus, many changes fit within the
parameters of existing privacy policies. Beyond that, however,
privacy policies are often revised. While some companies
promise to obtain consumer consent to changes in their
policies, 15 5 often privacy policies change without consumer
consent.
The potential for changes in a company's data practices is
relevant to calculating the expected disutility from present-day
data collection because consumers generally cannot withdraw
their data at a later date if they are not satisfied with a change
in practice, either to take it with them to another company or
simply to have it removed from the collections of the company
that collected it and everyone to whom it may have been
transferred.156

1'
See Aleecia M. McDonald and Lorrie F. Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy
Policies, 4 IIS: J of L & Pol for the Info Soc 540, 550-60 (2008), online at
http: //moritzlaw.osu.edulstudents/groups/is/files/2012/02/Cranor Formatted Final.pdf
(visited Sept 15, 2013) (discussing how long it takes readers to read or skim policies).
15s See, for example, Google, PrivacyPolicies (cited in note 151).
15s A proposed EU data privacy regulation would incorporate a "right to be
forgotten." See, for example, Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 Stan L Rev
Online 88, 89-90 (2012), online at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-
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Finally, some harms result from inadequate data security or
the actions of rogue insiders. While online businesses may
reassure consumers that steps are being taken to protect the
security of their data, consumers have no real information about
company security practices. Legal regulation of data security is
generally limited to "breach notification" laws, which are of
limited value in prospective assessment of the security practices
of online businesses.1 5 7 Information about data security comes to
consumers only episodically, when breaches make news.
Moreover, data breach notification tells users little or nothing
about the potential for bad acts by rogue company insiders.
3.

Imperfect information raises the costs of avoiding or
mitigating disutility.

In principle, Internet users can take some steps to avoid
data collection and thus mitigate the potential for associated
disutility. Here, however, users are thwarted by the ubiquity of
online tracking and the complexity of the available mechanisms
for avoiding tracking.s5 8 Moreover, as reported in recent
studies, 15 9 companies respond to user adoption of mechanisms of
avoiding tracking, such as deleting cookies, with technologies
aimed at circumventing those mechanisms. The transaction
costs associated with obtaining information about online data
collection and methods of mitigating its potential disutility are
malleable and generally in the hands of the online companies
paradox/right-to-be-forgotten (visited Sept 15, 2013). See European Commission,
European Parliament and Council Proposed Regulation 2012/0011 (COD) on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processingof personal data and on the free
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) (European Commission
2012), online at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com
2012_11 en.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013). For the revised proposal, see Committee on Civil
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Draft Report on the proposalfor a regulationof the
European Parliamentand of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data
Protection Regulation), online at http://www.europarl.europa.eulmeetdocs /20092014/
documents/libe/pr/922/922387/922387en.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
117 For discussions of breach notification laws, see Joseph Simitian, How a Bill
Becomes a Law, Really, 24 Berkeley Tech L J 1009 (2009).
158 See Lorrie Cranor, Can Users Control Online BehavioralAdvertising Effectively?,
10 IEEE Xplore 93 (Mar-Apr 2012); Tene and Polonetsky, 13 Minn J L, Sci, & Tech at
285, 291-92 (cited in note 1).
"s9 Chris J. Hoofnagle, et al, BehavioralAdvertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse, 6
Harv L & Pol Rev 273, 292-93 (2012); Ashkan Soltani, et al, Flash Cookies and Privacy
*2-4 (Aug 10, 2009), online at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
1446862&download=yes (visited Sept 15, 2013).
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themselves. 16 0 Companies have every incentive to keep these
transaction costs high in order to discourage consumers from
taking steps to avoid data collection.
4.

Imperfect information about the marginal effects of
particular instances of data collection.

Though the deficits of information about company data
practices and of statistical information about the various
potential harms of data collection are severe, at least they could
in principle be addressed by reasonably straightforward
measures. Companies could be required to provide more
transparent disclosures of their practices. 16 1 Even if individual
users are unlikely to invest in making sense of more detailed
disclosures, if such disclosures were required, public and private
consumer advocates could step in to provide tools, ratings,
certifications, and so forth. 162 Alternatively, company practices
could be audited for compliance with some set of standards. 163
Government and other groups could collect more detailed
statistical information about downstream harm from data
collection. While these are difficult problems, theoretically,
practically, and politically, there are far more intractable
problems with the "purchase" analogy.
For an Internet user to weigh the costs and benefits of a
particular online activity, the user must estimate the marginal
expected disutility of the particular data collection associated
with that activity. To determine marginal disutility, an Internet
user must have information about how the incremental data
collected in association with the particular activity changes the
overall availability of information about her in the online
ecosystem. Not only that, she must be able to connect that

160See

Sovern, 74 Wash L Rev at 1074-90 (cited in note 104).

161 See, for example, Tene and Polonetsky, 13 Minn J L, Sci, & Tech at 334-37 (cited
in note 1) (describing legislative proposals to mandate more transparent disclosure).
162 See, for example, id at 345-47 (cited in note 1); Lorrie
Faith Cranor, Necessary
But Not Sufficient: Standardized Mechanisms for Privacy Notice and Choice, 10 J
Telecomm & High Tech L 273 (2012).
163See, for example, Deborah C. Peel, Privacy Trust Framework, online at
http://ssrn.comlabstract=2231667 (visited Sept 15, 2013); Kenneth A. Bamberger and
Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy On the Books and On the Ground, 63 Stan L Rev 247, 263
(2011).
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increment in available information to an increment in expected
disutility. This is essentially an impossible task.164
Especially in the current online ecosystem, in which various
players vie to collect data about individual Internet users, there
are many sources of data available, some of which are
redundant. When deciding whether to engage in a transaction
involving data disclosure, consumers have no way to know what
personal data about them, other than information publicly
searchable on the Internet, is already available to whom. The
incremental information availability associated with any
particular data collection may also depend on what information
other people disclose. For example, an individual seeking to
determine the potential impact of a social media provider's
collection and use of personal information she discloses in using
the service would have to know what personal information the
social media provider already has collected about her from other
sources-including her friends, family members, and associates
who already participate in the service. Consumers generally
cannot track information about them disclosed by others. (Nor,
in deciding whether to participate in an online activity, are they
likely to account fully for any external disutility their decisions
to allow data collection impose on others.)
Moreover, the potential uses of consumer data (both positive
and negative) generally depend on aggregating information
about a consumer from multiple sources and on aggregating
data from many consumers.165 There is no reason to think that
this aggregation process is linear. The increment in cognizable
information from any added data depends on the entire web of
information that is already available and may change when
further data is collected from the user herself or from others.
Finally, it is often difficult, if not impossible, even in retrospect,
to trace any particular disutility caused by data access to any
particular data disclosure. The incremental expected disutility
associated with a particular data collection may be impossible to
calculate even in principle, 166 much less reasonably estimated in
advance by individual consumers at any remotely feasible cost.

164

See Zarsky, 5 Yale J L & Tech at 34-35 (cited in note 104) (making a similar

point).
165 See Solove, 126 Harv L Rev at *9-10 (cited in note 104); Nehf, 2005 U Ill J L,
Tech, and Pol at 30 (cited in note 104).
16 See David Dequech, Bounded Rationality, Institutions, and Uncertainty, 4 J Econ
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B.

Consumer Decisions about Online Activity Are Affected by
Bounded Rationality

The severe problems of imperfect information and limited
information processing ability facing an Internet user seeking to
decide whether the potential benefits of online activity are worth
the potential costs of data collection are compounded by certain
well-known effects of bounded rationality.167 Because these
issues have been discussed at length by others with respect to
privacy decisionmaking16 8 and because the insights of behavioral
economics merely provide additional nails in the coffin of the
idea of data collection as price, there is no need to belabor them
here. Briefly, human beings are not good at estimating the
expected costs of low probability, high cost harms, yet most
disutility from data collection is of that type. We tend to account
inadequately for expected costs that are deferred or are not
salient. Data collection is deferred from the initial decision to
access an online product or service and operates quietly in the
background of online activity. 169 When faced with imperfect
information and the need for complicated assessments of value,
cascade or herding effects are possible, in which individuals rely
on others' behavior as proxies for quality assessment. Finally,
there is evidence that individuals react irrationally to the zeroprice point 170 and are overly willing to purchase goods at zero
price to the neglect of potential disutilities associated with those
goods. The behavioral advertising business model seems almost
designed to take advantage of these aspects of bounded
rationality.

Issues 911, 912 (2001) (discussing the possibility of "fundamental uncertainty" in which
decisions must be made before some necessary information exists).
167 For overviews, see generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard
Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471 (1998); Dan
Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions
(HarperCollins 2008). For recent applications of behavioral economics in the related
arena of longer-term consumer contracts, see generally Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction By
Contract:Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets (Oxford 2012).
168 See, for example, Solove, 126 Harv L Rev at *6-7 (cited in note 104); Alessandro
Acquisti and Jens Grossklags, What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us About
Privacy?, in Alessandro Acquisti, et al, ed, Digital Privacy: Theory, Technologies and
Practices363 (Auerbach 2007); Nehf, Open Book at 186-256 (cited in note 104).
169
See, in a similar context, Bar-Gill, Seduction By Contract at 8-14 (cited in note
167).
170 See Shampanier, Mazar, and Ariely, 26 Marketing Sci at 743 (cited in note 97).
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Moreover, decisions relating to activities the effects of which
are small individually, but potentially large cumulatively, are
subject to a kind of internal collective action problem. The
expected disutility of data collection is, as discussed above,
cumulative. Especially once some data about an individual is
"out there," the collection of any single additional piece of data
seems unlikely to have a large impact on the individual's
expected disutility from data collection overall, though a
sequence of data collections may have a large impact. Each day's
decision to continue on with an online product or service is made
in the context of a small contribution to the aggregate data
collected and it is easy for a consumer to discount its
importance.1 7' Moreover, once enough data is accumulated in
the online ecosystem, an individual may come to believe
(correctly or not172 ) that she has little to lose as a result of
further data collection.
C.

The Missing "Purchase" Transaction

Not only are consumers unable to come up with useful
estimates of the expected disutility they are incurring by
allowing data collection, but the simple picture of a purchase
transaction in which consumer data is exchanged for an
information product is also misleading. The bulk of data
collection does not occur at the time a consumer first accesses a
zero-price online product or service. The online behavioral
advertising model is "buy now, pay later." Or, more accurately, it
is a model that involves payments over time for ongoing access
to services. Moreover, unlike a lease or a gym membership, the
payments are not fixed ahead of time nor are they collected at
intervals in a way that is salient to the consumer. Instead, a
company's access to consumer data occurs quietly and
incrementally behind the scenes, unless and until some
detectable and traceable potential harm comes to fruition.

1'
See Katherine J. Strandburg, Social Norms, Self Control, and Privacy in the
Online World, in Katherine J. Strandburg and Daniela Raicu, eds, Privacy and
Technologies of Identity: A Cross-Disciplinary Conversation (2005); Katherine J.
Strandburg, Privacy, Rationality, and Temptation: A Theory of Willpower Norms, 57
Rutgers L Rev 1237, 1243 (2005) (discussing this issue extensively from the perspective
of willpower and self-control).
17
The individual's belief is most likely incorrect to some degree, since personal
information that might be relevant to advertisers evolves dynamically over time.
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Perhaps better than the analogy to a purchase transaction
would be an analogy to obtaining free medical care in exchange
for participating in a trial of a new medical treatment. 173
Researchers are willing to provide free care because of the
benefits they (and, presumably, future patients) receive from
patients' participation in medical trials. In order for the
researchers to obtain the benefits of the research, however, the
patient is subjected to some risk. Like the potential disutility of
data collection, the risk of participating in a treatment trial
often grows the longer a patient participates in the trial, along
with the benefits of the free treatment. Also similarly, if a
patient decides to quit a particular experimental treatment, she
may well continue to suffer some risk from the accumulated
effects of the treatment. Because of these risks, and because
patients generally cannot be expected to have either the
information or the expertise to estimate them, there are strict
standards for obtaining informed consent from patients
participating in medical research. 174 Beyond that, because
patients' lack of expertise leaves them vulnerable to exploitation
by doctors even if they give informed consent, we impose ethical
duties on physicians.1 7 5 In the medical context, we would be
shocked if researchers secretly used information they gleaned
from a patient's participation in a treatment trial to decrease
her well-being or subject her to greater risk. In the personal
data context, the use of accumulated consumer data to offer
particular consumers worse deals through price discrimination
is one of the goals.
To sum up, the analogy between the online data collection
associated with behavioral advertising and more familiar
purchase transactions falls apart upon inspection. With regard
to estimating the expected disutility from online data collection
and assessing the effectiveness of measures they can take to
avoid it, consumers are almost entirely at sea. Rather than

See Solove, 126 Harv L Rev at 17 (cited in note 104) (discussing the different
approach to consent in the medical arena); Tene and Polonetsky, 13 Minn J L, Sci, &
Tech at 340 (cited in note 1) (same). See also Directive 95/46/EC at Art. 2(h) (cited in
note 28) (defining "data subject's consent" as "free given, specific and informed").
114 See Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard
and Experimental Therapy, 28 Am J L & Med 361, 364-70, 379-92 (2002).
15 See AMA's Code of Medical Ethics, especially Principles I, IV, VIII, online at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medicalethics.page? (visited Sept 15, 2013).
173
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handing over their data as the price for online products and
services in a tidy purchase transaction, consumers are
essentially doing what amounts to closing their eyes and taking
an unknown risk in exchange for a presently salient benefit.
IV. Is DATA COLLECTION JUST THE PRICE WE NEED TO PAY FOR
A VIBRANT INTERNET?

Proponents of the behavioral advertising business model
argue that even if behaviorally targeted advertising, with its
associated data collection, is a net negative for consumers, its
cost is a small price to pay for all of the free advertisingsupported products and services available online. 17 6 Indeed,
some go so far as to suggest that regulation of behavioral
advertising would kill the Internet goose that lays the golden
egg. 177 So far, I have argued that the disutility from behavioral
targeting and data collection is not appropriately viewed as a
price paid for online products and services. But is it true,
nonetheless, that the online ecosystem needs behavioral
advertising to sustain it? Of course, no one can answer this
question with certainty, but in this Part I argue that apocalyptic
predictions of this sort should be taken with a large grain of salt.
Would Revenue Loss from Banning Behaviorally Targeted
Advertising Cripple the Internet?

A.

Very few would dispute that free online products and
services create tremendous value for users. For example, the
IAB Europe-sponsored study estimated the total user surplus
from online activity in 2010 as about $130 billion dollars total
for the US and Europe.1 78 Free services were estimated to
generate about 80 percent of the total consumer surplus or about
$105 billion, 179 with email (16 percent), search (15 percent),
social networks (11 percent), instant messaging (10 percent),
and Internet phone (7 percent) leading the list.1o As mentioned

"6 See, for example, Thierer and Szoka, Targeted Online Advertising at 8 (cited in
note 3).
177

Id.

IAB Europe, Consumers Driving the Digital Uptake at *16 (cited in note 53)
(converted from 100 billion Euros).
"7 Id at 20 (converted from 80 billion Euros).
1
Id at 19.
178
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earlier, these numbers may underestimate consumer disutility
from data collection and thus overestimate consumer surplus.
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that consumers place a high value
on many ad-supported online information products.
The mere fact that advertising-supported online activity
generates high consumer surplus does not tell us how much of
that surplus is attributable to behavioral advertising, however.
To begin with, behavioral advertising provides only a fraction of
online advertising revenue generally. 8 1 Moreover, contextual
advertising presumably would substitute for behavioral
advertising at least to some degree if behavioral advertising
were unavailable. Thus, online advertising-supported businesses
are not dependent exclusively or even primarily on revenue from
behavioral targeting. A mixture of contextual advertising and
paid services might generate an even larger consumer surplus,
given that contextual advertising is cheaper to generate, does
not impose the costs of amassing and processing large amounts
of user data, and does not distort the market toward producing
products and services geared to data extraction. The relevant
question is not whether consumers are receiving a large surplus
in the present market but whether consumers currently receive
a larger surplus than they would from a market involving only
contextual advertising and paid offerings.
To sharpen this point, imagine a ban on behaviorally
targeted advertising. How would advertisers respond? Assuming
that advertisers believe that behavioral advertising is more
effective than contextual advertising (as they apparently do,
given that they pay more for it), advertisers might react to such
a ban by investing less in online advertising overall. Whether
and how much advertisers would decrease their total
investments in online advertising when faced with such a ban
would depend on the relative marginal profitability of
alternative investments, including contextual advertising. The
fact that contextual and undirected advertising spending
currently is much greater than behavioral advertising spending
at least suggests that the resulting diminishment of total
spending on online advertising might not be particularly
large. 182
181In 2009, that fraction was about 18 percent. See Beales, The Value of Behavioral
Targetingat *3 (cited in note 16).
182 From the beginning of online advertising, there has been
debate, consternation,
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Even if a ban on behavioral advertising reduced total
investment in developing online products and services, it is not
clear that investment devoted to meeting consumer preferences
would decrease. Advertising-supported products are developed
primarily to meet the preferences of advertisers, with consumer
preferences only indirectly represented. It seems reasonable to
assume that catering to advertiser demand for data collection
demands substantial investments in data collection, storage and
processing, and in algorithm development related to ad
targeting. Banning behavioral advertising would allow
producers of online products and services to avoid those costs.
The 2010 IAB-sponsored study estimated that the total cost of
providing the bundle of advertising and information products
available online was $24 billion per year out of total revenue of
$40 billion, based on profits of 40 percent or $16 billion. 183 As
noted above, it is unlikely that banning behavioral targeting
would deprive advertising intermediaries of all of the revenue
currently devoted to behavioral advertising. Nonetheless, to be
conservative, assume that a ban on behavioral targeting would
lead to a 20 percent reduction in online advertising spending,
which is slightly more than the 18 percent share estimated by
the Beales study in 2009.184 Under that assumption, the decline
would be $8 billion.1 85 The study's estimate of consumer

and hype about its return on investment for advertisers relative to other media. See
Turow, The Daily You at 36-47 (cited in note 8). Some advertisers always have been, and
presumably always will be, willing to pay a premium for targeting their ads to audiences
they believe will be most susceptible to them relative to ads they believe will be less
effective. The impact that restrictions on particular types of advertising would have on
total spending on advertising does not follow straightforwardly from this observation,
however.
18
IAB Europe, Consumers Driving the Digital Uptake at *16 (cited in note 53). The
study used a profit margin of 40 percent to calculate producer surplus. The cost number
above is obtained by subtracting the study's estimated profit from estimated revenue. All
figures are converted from Euros. See id.
184 Beales, The Value of BehavioralTargeting at 3 (cited in note 16).
In A better, but probably still conservative, assumption would be that Goldfarb and
Tucker are correct in their estimate that non-behaviorally targeted ads are only 35
percent as effective as behaviorally targeted ads. Goldfarb and Tucker, Privacy
Regulation and Online Advertising at *2, 27-28 (cited in note 27). If revenue declined in
proportion to effectiveness, then one would expect a revenue decline of only about $5
billion. Alternatively, as they also suggest, a decline in effectiveness could result in an
increase in advertising expenditures, which, by the same reasoning that supports the
argument that banning behavioral advertising would kill the Internet by depriving
online companies of revenue, would suggest that banning behavioral advertising would
be a boon for online companies.
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willingness to pay to avoid data collection was $10 billion, 186
which is more than enough to make up for the decline in
advertising revenue. Moreover, there are several reasons to
expect that this figure is an underestimate. In estimating
willingness to pay to avoid data collection, the study apparently
gave respondents three options: "No personal info required";
"Protected limited info required (name, age, usage, . ..
"Protected full info required (name, age, usage, credit card, . ...
It is unclear what study participants would have understood the
option of "protected" data collection to mean, particularly since
many respondents were European. The European Union's Data
Protection Directive in principle provides far more robust
protection than United States law. 187 Since many potential costs
to consumers from data collection arise out of failures of
companies to protect their data, the study seems to have nudged
them to ignore those potential costs. In sum, there appears to be
no a priori reason to assume that a mixture of paid and
contextual advertising business models would be significantly
less capable of supporting a vibrant mixture of Internet offerings
than today's mixture of behavioral and contextual advertising
business models.
B.

Why Behavioral Advertising Business Models May Survive
Even if Consumers Prefer Paid or Contextual Advertising
Models

The previous sections argued that there are good reasons to
believe that Internet users would be better off in an online
market without behaviorally targeted advertising. Surveys
suggest that there is consumer demand for online businesses
that do not share user data.18 8 Yet what we see in the online
ecosystem is increasingly ubiquitous data collection driven by
advertiser demand for behaviorally targeted advertising. If there

186 JAB Europe, Consumers Driving the Digital Uptake at *22 (cited in note 53). The
study estimated 20 billion Euros total WTP to avoid both advertising and data collection.
It also estimated WTP per user at 2.7 Euros for ad avoidance and 1.6 Euros for data
collection avoidance. They scaled by the ratio of WTP to avoid data collection to total
WTP to avoid both and then converted to dollars. See id.
187European Parliament and Council, Directive 95/46/EC (cited in note 28).
18 See, for example, McDonald and Cranor, Beliefs and Behaviors at *25 (cited in
note 154) (noting that 70 percent of respondents stated that whether an online business
shared their data would "matter a lot" to their purchasing decisions, as compared, for
example, to 75 percent who said that free shipping "matters a lot").
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is consumer demand for them, why haven't paid or contextual
advertising-only alternatives emerged in greater numbers? The
discussion in Parts II and III suggests possible answers. As
emphasized already, Internet users cannot accurately assess
their expected disutility from data collection and its lack of
salience and delayed impact means that any preference signal
they send is likely to be weaker than it should be. Over and
above that issue, the characteristics of the online market make
it difficult for consumers to express their preferences about data
collection.
To begin with, consumers can choose online products and
services that do not engage in data collection only if they can
distinguish them from those that do. Currently, consumers
cannot determine what companies do with their data because
collection and use are hidden and privacy policies are written to
avoid liability and obfuscate the extent of data collection. On the
surface, a user's experience with a company that uses contextual
advertising and does not permit customer tracking would look
much the same as a company engaged in thoroughgoing data
collection and behavioral tracking. Even a paid online product or
service that displays no advertising might collect and sell users'
data, leaving the user none the wiser. This situation looks like
the classic market for lemons problem,18 9 associated with
credence and experience goods. Consumers cannot recognize
quality (here, absence of data collection for advertising) and
hence will not pay for it. As a result, the market spirals
downward.
The usual market mechanisms for avoiding such adverse
selection problems are screening and signaling. 190 Here, secrecy
and the difficulty of recognizing and tracing data-related harms
to particular sources undermine consumers' ability to screen for
good data practices. Reputation can be an effective screening
mechanism for experience goods and the online environment
helps consumers both to report good and bad experiences and to
find out what others have reported. 19 1 Reputation is not an
effective mechanism for screening for credence goods, such as

"9 See Akerlof, 84 Q J Econ at 488 (cited in note 4).
" See, for example, Stiglitz, 47 Am Econ at 21-22 (cited in note 4).
191 Of course, the effectiveness of online reputation systems depends on whether
they are credible. Since online reputation systems have a lot going on "under the hood,"
they themselves are experience goods.
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data collection, however, since consumers cannot judge quality
even after purchase.
Credible signaling by providers of online products and
services is difficult for several reasons. Common signaling
mechanisms are guarantees and warranties. One might think
that privacy policies could be used to provide such guarantees.
Currently, privacy policies tend to be confusing, vague, and
impenetrable. However, a company seeking to use its privacy
policy to assure customers that it was not going to collect their
data for advertising purposes could adopt much clearer and
more straightforward language. Of course, consumers would still
find it effectively impossible to monitor a company's compliance
with a promise not to collect and use data. Privacy policies are
thus considerably less effective than warranties and guarantees
as credible signals of "good" behavior. However, consumers are
backed up in privacy policy enforcement by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), which brings actions against companies
whose privacy policies are misleading or unfair. Though FTC
enforcement is quite spotty at present, in part because of the
difficulty of detecting violations of today's complicated and
vague privacy policies, a straightforward promise not to collect
data for marketing purposes would be easier for the FTC to
enforce. Indeed, companies seeking to fill consumer demand for
no-data-collection promises would presumably bring themselves
to the attention of the FTC by advertising those promises. Thus,
there is at least a theoretical possibility that categorical no-datacollection for marketing purposes could, when backed up by FTC
enforcement, be signaled to consumers by advertising and a very
clear privacy policy.
The complexity of the online ecosystem means, however,
that it might be difficult for many companies to ensure that data
collection for advertising purposes was not occurring in
connection with their online businesses. Currently, most
advertising-sponsored online businesses neither produce the
advertising displayed on their sites nor collect the data used to
target that advertising. Instead, they sell ad space to third-party
ad networks, which both serve the ads and collect the data for
tracking, using third-party cookies and other mechanisms. 192
192 See, for example, Turow, The Daily You at 179-80 (cited
in note 8); Hoofnagle, et
al, 6 Harv L & Pol Rev at 280-85 (cited in note 159); Soltani, et al, Flash Cookies and
Privacy at *2-4 (cited in note 159).
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Consumer-facing companies seeking to employ a no data
collection approach would have to contract with ad networks for
no-data-collection service and would themselves face technical
hurdles in ensuring that their sites were not used for data
collection for targeted advertising, 193 especially since there is
some degree of data collection that is necessary simply to
determine metrics commonly used to charge for ad placement,
such as numbers of views and numbers of clicks.
Moreover, because most advertising-supported online
businesses use intermediaries to select and place ads, consumer
demand for no-data-collection contextual advertising-supported
alternatives would have to be funneled from thousands of
websites and other online businesses to those ad networks. (Of
course, this issue would not apply to providers of online products
and services, such as Google and Facebook, whose business
models center around extracting data from consumers.)
Essentially, there would have to be a sufficiently strong signal of
consumer demand for no-data-collection alternatives either to
induce an online business to switch to a paid model or to induce
an ad network to develop a no-data-collection product to market
to advertisers. An online business would not be able unilaterally
to adopt a no-data-collection policy without taking on huge
transaction costs associated with selling advertising space on its
site. There are some businesses, such as major publishers and
entertainment companies, that sell their own ad space, 194 but
the transaction costs of such an approach put it out of reach for
a typical online business.
Also cutting against the effectiveness of a signaling
approach to solving the credence good problem is the growing
degree of user skepticism and distrust regarding online data
practices and many consumers' sense that their privacy is
already lost. 195 For example, a recent study showed that refusals
'
See, for example, In re Pharmatrak, Inc Privacy Litigation, 220 F Supp 2d 4 (D
Mass 2002), revd In re Pharmatrak,Inc, 329 F3d 9 (1st Cir 2003) (involving litigation
over the use of third-party cookies to collect information from users of a website in
violation of the website's agreement with an ad network). Newer tracking technologies
are much harder to detect than third-party cookies.
19 See Turow, The Daily You at 71 (cited in note 8).
195 See Mark S. Ackerman, Lorrie Cranor, and Joseph Reagle, Privacy in ECommerce: Examining User Scenarios and Privacy Preferences *5 (ACM Conference on
E-Commerce
1999),
online at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edulviewdoc/summary?doi=
10.1.1.38.595 (visited Sept 15, 2013); Catherine Dwyer, The Effect of Behavioral
Targeting on Trust in
E-Commerce *14-21
(Apr 2,
2011), online
at
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to reveal information online have increased over time, at least in
part because Internet users are becoming more aware of the
broad range of contexts in which privacy concerns are

relevant. 19 6
If a company collects data in order to deliver its core
services (such as search or social media), the difficulty of
credibly signaling that the data would be used only for core
services would be even greater, since such a company would
have to credibly commit that it would not hoard and decide, at
some point in the future, to sell it or exploit it for targeted
advertising.
Probably the most insurmountable barrier to the emergence
of no-data-collection alternatives, however, is the intertwined
nature of the online data ecosystem. Because it is so difficult to
assess the marginal expected disutility related to data collection
by any single product or service, consumers may well view
avoiding data collection by any one particular product or service
as a futile gesture in light of continued data collection by other
products and services she uses, along with continued collection
of data related to her from others who do not switch.
A hypothetical example may help to illustrate the
systematic difficulties consumers and online businesses would
have in switching to no-data-collection alternatives. Imagine
Abby, a hypothetical Internet user:
Abby is considering whether to visit an ad-supported
online travel site, such as Trip Advisor (tripadvisor.com)
or to subscribe to a hypothetical paid alternative, Travel
Without Tracking (TWT.com). To decide whether it is
worth switching, Abby must estimate her expected
(visited
http: //papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1801366&download=yes
Sept 15, 2013); McDonald and Cranor, Beliefs and Behaviors at *26 (cited in note 154)
(finding a large discrepancy between willingness to accept and willingness to pay related
to data collection and hypothesizing that this may be due to a feeling that privacy is
already lost and also finding that 69 percent of respondents believe that it is "wrong to
be asked to pay to keep companies from invading my privacy"); Aleecia M. McDonald and
Jon Peha, Track Gap: Policy Implications of User Expectations for the 'Do Not Track'
Internet Privacy Feature *25 (TPRC Sept 2011), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=1993133&download-yes (visited Sept 15, 2013) ("Track Gap")
(finding that 40 percent of survey respondents would be "unsurprised" and 13 percent
"resigned" if they learned that a Do Not Track feature had no effect).
'
Avi Goldfarb and Catherine Tucker, Shifts in Privacy Concerns *13-16 (Jan 21,
(visited
2012), online at http: /papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1976321
Sept 15, 2013). See also Dwyer, The Effect of Behavioral Targeting on Trust in ECommerce at *18-19 (cited in note 195).
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disutility from Tripadvisor's data collection. She might
begin by looking at the tripadvisor.com privacy policy. 19 7
Tripadvisor's privacy policy is laid out fairly cleanly and
written relatively comprehensively as these things go. It
is 4000 words (about nine pages) long. It tells Abby that
Tripadvisor receives and stores "any information you
enter on our Web site or give us in any other way." It also
tells her that Tripadvisor "may periodically obtain both
personal and non-personal information about you from
partners, and other
affiliated entities, business
independent third-party sources and add it to other
information about you" and that Tripadvisor will
automatically collect "session data, including your IP
address, Web browser software, and referring Web site.
We also may collect information about your online
activity, such as content viewed and pages visited."
The privacy policy explains that Tripadvisor and its
"affiliated websites" use cookies and Web beacons to
track her activity for various purposes, including the
delivery of advertising. Tripadvisor also collects
information about her location if she accesses it from her
mobile phone, unless she has disabled that access using
her phone's privacy settings. The policy explains that
information collected through Tripadvisor is used to
serve ads both on Tripadvisor and "elsewhere online."
Abby is momentarily relieved to read on page four of the
policy that Tripadvisor does not share "personal
information (such as email addresses) with unaffiliated
third parties so they can serve you with advertisements."
She is confused to read in the next paragraph, however,
that Trip advisor "allow [s] third parties to collect
information about your online activities through cookies
and other technologies. These third parties include (1)
business partners, who collect information when you view
or interact with one of their advertisements on our sites,
and (2) advertising networks, which collect information
about your interests when you view or interact with one

Tripadvisor, Privacy policy,
1s
privacy.html (visited Sept 15, 2013).

online

at

http://www.tripadvisor.com/pages/
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of the advertisements they place on many different Web
sites on the Internet."
These third parties, she learns, use the information they
collect about her activities on tripadvisor.com to serve
ads. Moreover, Tripadvisor disclaims any responsibility
for what these third parties might do with the
information they collect and reminds her that they are
not covered by Tripadvisor's privacy policy.
Later, Abby reads that, in addition to the information
collected by third party business partners and
advertising networks, Tripadvisor shares her information
with third-party vendors who provide various services
including "marketing," with business partners if she
chooses to access "optional services," with "referring
websites," with social media services if accessed through
the Tripadvisor website, and with Tripadvisor's "parent
companies and domestic and international corporate
(including
and
websites
affiliate
companies
DaoDao.com)."
Though Abby is assured that Tripadvisor's corporate
affiliates will follow data practices at least as restrictive
as those in the Tripadvisor privacy policy, Tripadvisor
also disclaims responsibility for the privacy practices of
the business partners, referring websites, and social
media services with which Tripadvisor shares her
information. On the whole, after reading the Tripadvisor
privacy policy, Abby is even more eager to avoid data
collection.
To properly compare her options, though, Abby has to
figure out what she can do to avoid data collection while
continuing to use Tripadvisor. She clicks on a link on
tripadvisor.com which takes her to the website of the
Network Advertising Initiative (NAI), which provides a
method to opt out of advertising from all of its affiliates.
Abby learns that the NAI opt-out works by placing a
cookie on her computer and must be implemented
separately for every browser/computer combination she
uses. Confusingly, she learns that the opt-out cookie will
be deleted any time she clears her cookies after a browser

162

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2013

session and that if her browser privacy settings are set to
prohibit third-party cookies she cannot set the opt-out
cookie.
Abby wonders whether the NAI opt-out cookie actually
stops companies from tracking her or simply stops them
from placing targeted ads. From the NAI FAQs she
learns that "[o]pt-out cookies signal to NAI member
companies not to tailor ads based on information
collected across websites, but may leave the cookies used
for other purposes in place." It seems that the NAI optout cookie may not stop affiliated companies from
accumulating data about her after all.
Seeking some clarity about all of this, Abby does some
online searching to find out what others are saying about
the NAI opt-out cookie and other means to avoid being
tracked online. She reads that various browser settings
can be used to decrease online tracking, though these
settings may also lead to decreased functionality of some
online products and services. The options seem to be
many and are different for each browser she uses.
Figuring out how to choose among them seems like a
daunting task. Moreover, Abby's online research has
turned up reports that websites are beginning to use
more complicated technical means to avoid user attempts
to opt out. She reads about DNS aliasing, ETags, Flash
cookies, HTML5 web storage, Evercookies, and browser
fingerprinting. 1 98
Based on her research, Abby becomes convinced of two
things: first, that the privacy policy gives her very little
useful information about what Tripadvisor is doing with
the data that it may be collecting about her activities on
the site and, second, that she will be unable to keep up
with the technical arms race in online tracking using the
her browser, phone, and other settings. She decides to
use her browser's default privacy settings, assuming that
they must be some reasonable compromise between
avoiding tracking and functionality. She also decides that
19s See Dwyer, The Effect of Behavioral Targeting on Trust in E-Commerce at *7
(cited in note 195).
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she should assume that, no matter what she does, data
about all her activities on Tripadvisor will be collected
and made available to third parties.
So far, so good for our fledging TWT.com service. Now
that she is more informed, Abby is more worried than
ever about all the data collection going on. Before
subscribing to TWT.com, though, Abby decides she
should figure out how much difference paying for TWT
rather than using Tripadvisor would make to the
aggregate data available about her online. She thinks
about the types of data that could be collected from her
activities on Tripadvisor, which include information
about potential vacation spots, the kinds of activities that
interest her, the types of hotels she is interested in, her
prospective dates of travel, and so forth. She then thinks
about whether that information could be collected from
her online activities away from Tripadvisor. She soon
realizes that most of the information is also reflected in
her Google searches, visits to hotel and airline web sites,
email exchanges with friends, visits to websites related to
the activities that she wishes to pursue while traveling,
and so forth. Based on her research and on her reading of
the Tripadvisor privacy policy, she figures that she
should probably assume that all of that information also
is being collected from those other sources. (She certainly
doesn't think it would be worthwhile to try to understand
the privacy policies and data practices of all of those
other online products and services, especially since she
has already spent her entire weekend trying to figure out
what is going on with Tripadvisor.) She also realizes that
her past visits to Tripadvisor.com have already revealed
considerable information about her that will remain
available in the online ecosystem even if she switches to
TWT.com. She begins to think that there may be no point
in paying for TWT.com if she cannot make comparable
moves everywhere online.
As a final check, she consults with some of her friends
about TWT.com and reads some online reviews. The
reviews praise TWT's no-data-collection approach and its
technology. However, they agree that, at this point, TWT
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just cannot compete with Tripadvisor, given Tripadvisor's
existing trove of user-generated travel information and
active user base. The reviewers thus advise a "wait-andsee" approach. Abby's friends reinforce her feeling that
switching would be futile. A few seem interested, but
most are unwilling to be in the vanguard of moving to a
new service. Some of them discount her concerns about
data harms. "I've never known anyone who has had a
problem," one says. "Everyone uses Tripadvisor," says
another. "If it were that risky, nobody would use it."
Some are skeptical that TWT will even abide by its
promises not to collect and exploit data for advertising
purposes. "How would you even know?" one asks. Some
are outraged at the very idea that they would have to pay
to avoid being tracked online. Mostly, they think, "There
is no real way to avoid online data collection, so why
waste the money?" In light of all of this, Abby decides not
to subscribe to TWT.com. Moreover, the next time she
hears about a paid alternative to one of the online
products and services she uses she remembers all the
time she wasted trying to figure out whether to switch to
TWT and ignores it.
This hypothetical vignette illustrates how difficult it is for
consumers to determine whether a move to a no-data-collection
product or service is worth it. It also illustrates the
interconnectedness of data disclosures, which means that little
is to be gained by one-off switches to no-data-collection products
and services. The resulting barriers to consumer switching raise
corresponding barriers to entry for paid or contextualadvertising-only alternatives.
Some apparently contradictory observations about Internet
users' behavior make more sense in light of the impenetrability
of online data collection: users
and interconnectedness
consistently express high levels of privacy concern in response to
surveys; they frequently, but inconsistently, adopt simple
protective measures, such as cookie deletion, but generally do
not adopt more complex technical defenses against data
collection; and they continue to use a wide-range of online
products and services despite their privacy concerns. As a
practical matter, Internet users have only three choices: 1) go
more or less "all in" for the online experience, as Abby decided to
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do, 2) withdraw significantly or completely from online activities
in order to protect their privacy, or 3) deploy drastic and timeconsuming technical measures, such as encryption and Tor. 199
The second option is unlikely to appeal to many users, and is
especially unlikely to be chosen by those who have grown up
with the Internet. The third option is available only to the
technically savvy. Because of its costs, it seems likely to be
exercised only by two types of users: users who have something
particularly important to hide, such as members of dissident
political organizations, law enforcement, or criminals, and
hacker types for whom outwitting data collection is its own
reward. Most users are likely to go with the first option,
avoiding online businesses that seem sufficiently sketchy, 2 00
taking simple precautions that they see others taking, and
hoping for the best.
V. WHERE Do WE

GO

FROM HERE?

The behavioral advertising business model gives companies
an insatiable thirst for personal information and drives them to
obfuscate the extent of that data collection from consumers.
Those imperatives cannot be avoided by improving "notice and
choice" or even by more robust consent regimes. Such attempts
to improve the market also cannot overcome the two basic
sources
of market
failure:
the
impenetrability
and
interconnectedness of online data collection. The seriousness
with which we should address market failure in the data
collection arena depends on what we believe about the
magnitude and distribution of the social costs of that failure.
The trouble, of course, is that we, as a society, can do only a
somewhat better job of predicting the aggregate costs of
ubiquitous data collection than individuals can do of estimating
the costs of their own online activities. We can and should collect
better statistics about the effects of data breaches, identity theft,
stalking, harassment, and so forth. The societal consequences of

199 See Richard Warner and Robert H. Sloan, Behavioral
Advertising: From OneSided Chicken to Informational Norms, 15 Vand J Enter & Tech L 49, 64-65 (2012)
(describing this situation as a game of "one-sided chicken"). Tor is a technology for
protecting the "to" and "from" data of internet communications. See Tor: Overview,
online at https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (visited Sept 15, 2013).
200 See Hoofnagle, et al, How Different Are Young Adults from Older Adults at *10,
13 & Tables 2, 8 (cited in note 47).
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price discrimination, government access to information about
the personal lives of citizens, siloed access to news,
entertainment, and other intellectual goods, automated
reputations
that
are
never
forgotten,
and
chilled
experimentation and inquiry are old debates, however, and not
so easily resolved. 201 Estimating those costs is part unsolvable
empirical question and part normative policy question. The
primary aim of this Article is not to resolve those questions, but
to argue that we cannot avoid confronting them by pinning our
hopes on a mythical market for personal data. 202 We need to
have the normative debate.
The reader will not be surprised to learn that my intuition
is that the potential social costs of behavioral advertising's thirst
for personal information are large and its benefits comparatively
small when the potential for contextual advertising-based and
paid business models, along with the way in which online search
has decreased the transaction costs involved in matching buyers
and sellers are considered. I also believe that survey responses
indicating that Internet users are unhappy with ubiquitous
tracking should be taken seriously. In the current online
environment, saying that Internet users do not seriously value
their privacy because they continue to use online products and
services that track them is like saying that drivers do not care
about the potential for auto accidents because they continue to
drive. It is always a question of the alternatives.
In this last section, I therefore assume that my intuitions
about cost are correct and briefly consider possible responses to
the failure of the current online market. There is always the
possibility, though it is probably a slim one, that the behavioral
advertising model will fail of its own accord because it is not
profitable enough. Perhaps advertisers themselves will
determine that the extensive data collection and tracking now
underway does not boost ad effectiveness enough to be worth the
For discussion of these topics, see Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational
Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 Stan L Rev 1373, 1416-18, 1421 (2000); Jeffrey
Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America 8-9 (Random House
2000); Priscilla M. Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public
Policy 213, 225 (North Carolina 1995); Daniel Solove, ConceptualizingPrivacy, 90 Cal L
Rev 1087, 1126, 1143-46 (2002). See generally Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and
Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 Vand L Rev 1609 (1999).
202
Compare to Tene and Polonetsky, 13 Minn J L Sci & Tech at 284 (cited in note 1)
(arguing that policymakers must address "the underlying normative question is online
behavioral tracking a social good or an unnecessary evil?").
201
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investment. Failing that, what are the alternatives? Since the
market fails because of the impenetrability of data practices and
the interconnectedness of information, the goal should be to do
two things: incentivize data practices that are not impenetrable
and disentangle the collection of data associated with different
online activities. Note that incentivizing data practices that are
not impenetrable is different from incentivizing efforts to
explain impenetrable data practices through simplified notice.
The idea is that data practices should be such that consumers
have an intuitive sense of what is going on with their data.
The most straightforward approach would be to ban data
collection and processing for behaviorally targeting advertising.
Of course, such a ban would leave open the question of what to
do about data collection for other purposes, which would have to
be considered on their own merits. That would be a good thing.
Behaviorally targeted advertising drives so much intertwined
data collection that it both muddies the waters for societal
debate about the desirability of collecting particular data for
particular purposes and undermines the market's ability to
reflect consumer preferences about data-based products and
services.
Constructing a ban on behavioral advertising would require
some attention to details, of course. A line would have to be
and contextual
behaviorally
targeted
drawn between
advertising, for example. One would probably also want to draw
a line between behavioral advertising and first-party
recommendations based on past purchases. The key would be to
construct such distinctions with the goal of solving the problems
of impenetrability and interdependency so as to make it possible
for consumers to express their preferences in the market. So, for
example, the line between contextual and behaviorally targeted
advertising could be drawn to permit advertising based on shortterm tracking of a consumer's use of a particular product or
service (such as the short-term search queries that Yan, et al,
found most effective for targeting search advertising), 2 0 3 but not
long-term tracking and not tracking across different products or
services (regardless of whether they were co-owned). First-party
recommendations based on past purchasing could be permitted
because the data practice is reasonably clear to consumers and

203

See text accompanying note 34.
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any interdependency between data from different individuals
would be limited to data about purchases from a particular
online retailer. Consumers would be able to understand such
data practices and could move from one retailer to another
whose practices they preferred without particularly high
switching costs.
There are at least two major problems with such a proposal.
First, a ban would not accommodate any consumers who
actually wanted to be tracked. That problem could potentially be
solved by innovations aimed at allowing users to collect their
own data and make it available for targeted advertising. Such
approaches have been proposed 204 and would certainly have
more traction in the market if data collection by advertisers for
targeting purposes were banned. The second problem, of course,
is that there would be huge industry opposition to such a ban
and, in the United States at least, it would have effectively no
chance of being adopted. 2 05
A more limited type of approach would aim to mitigate the
market's failure to account for the consumer disutility associated
with data collection by focusing on reducing costs that are
collateral to the collection and use of data for targeting
advertising. For example, one might impose responsibilities of a
fiduciary or professional ethics character (and associated
liabilities) on those who collect and store data, require "privacy
by design" practices, or impose legal restrictions on data
practices that could be enforced through independent audits. 206
To the extent that consumer disutility stems from security
breaches, rogue actors, and other data misuses, these

204 See, for example, Vincent Toubiana, et al, Adnostic: Privacy Preserving Targeted
Advertising *5-6 (Proceedings of the 2010 Network and Distributed System Security
Symposium 2010); Mikhail Bilenko, Mathew Richardson, and Janice Tsai, Targeted, Not
Tracked: Client-Side Solutions for Privacy-Friendly Behavioral Advertising *11-15
(TPRC 2011), online at http: /papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1995127
(visited Sept 15, 2013).
205 There might also be First Amendment challenges to such a ban. See, for example,
Sorrell v IMS Health, Inc, 131 S Ct 2653 (2011). This is a complicated subject which I do
not address here. The EU is famously more willing to adopt stringent privacy regulations
than the US, but a ban on data collection for behavioral targeting would be a stretch
even for the EU.
206 See, for example, Ira Rubinstein and Nathan Good, Privacy by Design: A
Counterfactual Analysis of Google and Facebook Privacy Incidents, Berkeley Tech L J
*22-40 (forthcoming 2012), online at http: /papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
2128146 (visited Sept 15, 2013); Bamberger and Mulligan, 63 Stan L Rev at 269-72
(cited in note 163).

95]

ONLINE CONSUMER PREFERENCEDISCONNECT

169

approaches may be effective. Such efforts go only so far,
however. They do not make it possible for consumers to estimate
the remaining expected costs of data collection and use
accurately. Nor do they overcome the collective action problems
illustrated in the vignette about Abby. The market failures
remain.
The proposal of a "Do-Not-Track" option 20 7 that consumers
could deploy at low cost across all of their online activities has
some potential to address the collective action problems
associated with data interdependency and thus to lower the
barriers to entry for non-tracking alternatives. In principle, a
reduce
option would
drastically
robust
Do-Not-Track
information and transaction costs for Internet users seeking a
definitive way to opt out of tracking without having to concern
themselves with multiple technologies deployed by multiple
online entities. It might also form a rallying point for
overcoming the collective action problem between Internet
users, becoming a norm at least among some groups. If enough
users adopted a robust Do-Not-Track technology, there might be
sufficient incentives for ad networks to develop non-tracking
contextual advertising products for advertisers who wanted to
reach those users. Paid non-tracking alternatives might also
emerge because a robust Do-Not-Track technology would ensure
users that they were not being tracked surreptitiously.
Even a robust Do-Not-Track option might or might not be
sufficient to overcome the barriers to entry for non-tracking
alternatives that exist because of past data collection and
network effects. The success of a Do-Not-Track technology in
opening the market to alternative business models would
depend on how existing businesses interact with it and how
consumers respond to that interaction. Existing businesses
might respond by denying access or providing a severely
degraded experience to users who have invoked Do-Not-Track.
Users would then have to choose between a Do-Not-Track world
with few products and services available and a tracking world
with a wide variety of options. They might defect in large

207
See generally Hoofnagle, Urban, and Li, Privacy and Modern Advertising (cited
in note 143); Tracy A. Steindel, Note, A Path Toward User Control of Online Profiling, 17
Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev 459 (2011); Warner and Sloan, 15 Vand J Enter & Tech L
at 78-82 (cited in note 199); McDonald and Peha, Track Gap at *2-3 (cited in note 195);
Tene and Polonetsky, 13 Minn J L Sci & Tech at 284-85 (cited in note 1).
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numbers before there was time for alternative offerings to enter
the market. Do-Not-Track is most likely to succeed if it becomes
a social movement or norm, so that companies are hit with
serious reputational penalties for turning away those who have
opted not to be tracked. Alternatively, companies could be
required to provide the same access to all users, whether or not
they have opted for Do-Not-Track, which would force the market
to adjust to consumer preferences in that regard.
Some commentators respond to Do-Not-Track proposals by
arguing that a robust Do-Not-Track option would invite a type of
free riding, in which consumers would adopt Do-Not-Track while
assuming that they would continue to have access to free
advertising-supported online products and services. 208 If enough
consumers do that, the argument goes, there will be no revenue
to support such services and the thriving Internet economy will
collapse. This is really just a new variant of industry's argument
against "opt-in" approaches to advertising and data collection,
which has, for the most part, carried the day so far. 20 9 Of course,
this argument has some weight. The availability of a robust DoNot-Track mechanism could in principle mean the end of the
data-collection economy, and it is certainly possible that
consumers will fail to account for that possibility in deciding
whether to adopt a Do-Not-Track option.
But the free riding argument almost proves too much.
Similar arguments apply to all advertising-supported bundles.
Television viewers who walk out of the room during
commercials, magazine readers who skip past the ads, and those
who use DVRs and other ad-skipping technology undermine the
ad-supported business model in precisely the same way and
might similarly fail to appreciate that their behavior decreases
the advertising subsidy for the content they receive. While no
one has to my knowledge suggested confining TV viewers to
their couches during commercials, DVRs and other ad-skipping
208 See, for example, Comments of Thomas M. Lenard, Technology
Policy Institute
submitted in response to FTC Notice of Inquiry, "ProtectingConsumer Privacy in an Era
of Rapid Change: A Proposed Framework for Businesses and Policymakers" (Technology
Policy Institute
2011),
online
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/privacyreport
framework/00301-57629.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013); Daniel T. Rockey, Will the FTC's "Do
Not Track" ProposalSpell the End of Free Internet Content?, 16 BNA Insights 164, 167
(2011).
209 See, for example, Michael E. Staten and Fred H. Cate,
The Impact of Opt-In
Privacy Rules on Retail Markets: A Case Study of MBNA, 52 Duke L J 745, 769-83
(2003).
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technologies have been met with such arguments, generally in
the guise of discussions of copyright infringement. 2 1 0 There is
something odd about such arguments in today's technological
context, however. There is nothing inevitable, or even natural,
about the advertising-supported business model. It emerged as a
solution to two separate problems: the difficulty of getting
information about available products to potentially interested
consumers and the difficulty of collecting payment for broadcast
content. Separate paid markets for advertising and for broadcast
were not technically feasible at the time the advertising-based
model took root.
Times have changed. One of the Internet's great strengths
is the way in which it lowers the costs associated with
information flow, including the costs of searching for products
and services, the costs of producing and delivering informationbased products and services, and the costs of collecting payment
for such products and services. From a consumer perspective,
search may largely replace the value of advertising. To the
extent it does not, there seem to be few barriers to the
development of freestanding online platforms which could
aggregate advertising according to consumer interests.
Similarly, subscription and other paid models for online
products and services are now entirely feasible, as are
"freemium" business models in which a free version of a product
or service is used to entice consumers to purchase an upgraded
version. Of course, many online offerings can be delivered at
very low marginal cost. Offering them at a fee has the usual
deadweight losses associated with intellectual property, as well
as the distributional effects of any paid market. "Free"
advertising-supported offerings also have social costs, however,
and they also cater to the preferences of those with money to
spend. In any event, contextual advertising supports free
offerings without locking consumers into an inescapable data
collection web.
The behavioral advertising business model evolved because
online companies had cheap access to data about user activities
on their websites, while users were largely unaware of how
easily they could be tracked. We now seem to be thoroughly
ensconced in a data collection dominated online ecosystem. The
210 See, for example, Ned Snow, The TiVo Question: Does Skipping Commercials
Violate Copyright Law?, 56 Syracuse L Rev 27, 42-62 (2006).
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hurdles to incremental shifts by consumers to no-data-collection
offerings likely mean that moving to an ecosystem without
behavioral tracking (or with less of it) will require concerted
collective action, possibly through regulation.

